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COPYRIGHT HARM, FORESEEABILITY,  
AND FAIR USE 
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law needs a theory of harm that can give effect to its 
constitutional purpose. The Patent and Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress the power to enact federal copyright law “To 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”1 In order to achieve this 
objective, copyright law must balance the rights of owners and users.2 
Copyrights must be broad enough to give authors sufficient incentive to 
create, yet limited enough to allow others to use and build upon those 
works.3  
 
 
 ∗ © Christina Bohannan. Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. The 
author would like to thank Eric Andersen, Randall Bezanson, Tom Cotter, Herb Hovenkamp, Mark 
Janis, Mark Lemley, Todd Pettys, Caroline Sheerin, Alexander Somek, and Jerry Wetlaufer for their 
valuable comments. She would also like to thank James Cross for excellent research assistance. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 66–70 (2003) (explaining how copyright protection raises the cost of 
new expression); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 506–11 (1945) (stating that copyright “[p]rotection should not go substantially beyond the 
purposes of protection,” because “the very effect of protecting them is to make the enjoyment of their 
creations more costly”). 
 3. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2; Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law 
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 125 (1999) (“[T]he goal of 
intellectual property [law] is only to provide the ‘optimal incentive,’ not the largest incentive possible. 
Past a certain point, it would be inefficient to withhold works from the public domain in order to 
provide ever-decreasing ‘incentives’ to their creators.”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996). 
Copyright law’s perennial dilemma is to determine where exclusive rights should end and 
unrestrained public access should begin. If copyright is cast too narrowly, authors may have 
inadequate incentives to produce and disseminate creative works . . . . If copyright extends 
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The fair use doctrine is arguably the most important doctrine for 
striking this balance with regard to uses of copyrighted expression. Fair 
use considers four factors, the principal one being “harm to the market for 
the copyrighted work.”4 Unfortunately, recent developments in copyright 
law tend to obscure the concept of harm in fair use, preventing copyright 
law from striking the necessary balance between owners and users. This 
Article argues for a concept of “copyright harm” that defines the scope of 
fair use in relation to the purpose of copyright by limiting infringement to 
foreseeable uses and other harmful uses that are likely to reduce ex ante 
incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works. 
Historically, copyright law attempted to achieve balance by granting 
very limited rights to copyright owners. The earliest copyright statutes 
protected only against copying of the original copyrighted work itself, and 
not against copying of the original work in the creation of new or 
derivative works.5 In such cases of close or verbatim copying of the 
original work, it ordinarily could be presumed that the defendant’s 
copying had caused or would cause the copyright owner to lose sales of 
the copyrighted work. Thus, infringement was limited to copying that 
caused direct and material harm of a kind that, if allowed to continue, 
would affect a reasonable person’s decision to create or distribute the 
work.  
When the defendant used the work in a less foreseeable way, perhaps 
changing its meaning or purpose, the fair use doctrine was invoked to 
determine whether the use was infringing.6 Although courts have 
considered multiple factors in fair use analysis, the main focus has been on 
whether the defendant’s use would cause harm to the copyright owner’s 
 
 
too broadly, copyright owners will be able to exert censorial control over critical uses of 
existing works or may extract monopoly rents for access, thereby chilling discourse and 
cultural development. 
Id. Professor Netanel expands on these views in Neil Weinstock Netanel, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 30–
53, 109–53 (2008). 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 5. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (granting copyright protection 
only for maps, charts, and books for an initial term of fourteen years plus a renewal term of fourteen 
years and not granting protection over derivative works). See also Benjamin Kaplan, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 10 (1966) (arguing that in early copyright law, “if the accused book was a [new] 
work of authorship, it could not at the same time infringe”); John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The 
Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 475 (2005) (same).  
 6. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (assessing 
application of fair use doctrine to defendant’s copying of numerous letters in making an abridged 
version of plaintiff’s work but finding that harm could be inferred based on the amount taken and the 
similarity of the two works). Although courts currently treat fair use as an affirmative defense, the 
Folsom court apparently used it as part of the test for infringement. See infra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
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foreseeable markets. The emphasis on market harm in fair use analysis has 
served copyright’s constitutional objective of encouraging innovation by 
limiting infringement to uses that would likely affect a reasonable 
copyright owner’s decision to create or distribute the work.  
Over time, however, the scope of copyright protection has increased 
dramatically. Copyright owners now have the right to control not only the 
copying of their own works, but also the preparing of derivative works that 
“modify,” “transform,” or “adapt” the copyrighted work in any way.7 
Moreover, in fair use analysis, courts have begun to recognize, as a form 
of “harm to the market for the copyrighted work,” not only lost sales 
caused by the defendant’s use but also the inability to obtain licensing fees 
for many uses.8 This expansive view of copyrights leads to circularity in 
determining when a use is fair. Fair use turns primarily on whether the use 
causes harm to the copyright owner, but the copyright owner can nearly 
always argue that she has suffered harm, if only because the defendant 
could have paid a license fee for the use being challenged.9 Yet, whether 
the defendant was required to obtain a license (and thus could be said to 
have harmed the copyright holder by failure to obtain a license) turns on 
whether the use is fair.10  
These developments in copyright law bring into stark relief the 
importance of fair use. The fair use doctrine serves copyright’s 
constitutional purpose by mediating between the interests of owners and 
users of copyrighted material.11 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held 
that in most cases it is the fair use doctrine, not the First Amendment, that 
is responsible for safeguarding free speech in the use of copyrighted 
material.12  
 
 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000). 
 8. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 
1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Christina 
Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 597 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, 
Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 185, 189–
91 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124 
(1990) (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user 
has not paid royalties.”). 
 10. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387 (discussing circularity argument); Texaco, 60 
F.3d at 929 (same). See also Bohannan, supra note 8, at 597; Lemley, supra note 8 nn.31–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 975 (2002); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit Presumptions, 
and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 668 (1993). 
 12. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2001). 
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In an attempt to clarify the meaning of fair use, copyright scholars have 
posited two theories that have gained considerable support from courts and 
commentators: fair use as market failure13 and fair use as a balancing of 
interests.14 First, proponents of the fair use as market failure theory (as it is 
widely understood) say that copyright holders are entitled to payment for 
copying unless some instance of market failure, typically prohibitively 
high transaction costs, prevents the defendant from paying.15 As one 
scholar has put it, “market failure becomes for copyright, just as it is for 
private property more generally, the exclusive justification for such 
government intervention.”16  
Second, supporters of the balancing approach argue against the market 
failure approach on the ground that copyright’s purpose of encouraging 
innovation requires a fair use doctrine that puts more affirmative limits on 
copyright protection. Thus, the balancing approach attempts to weigh the 
social value of the defendant’s use against the harm to the copyright 
owner.17  
Unfortunately, neither of these proposed approaches fully achieves 
copyright’s purpose. The market failure theory wrongly applies a property 
approach to nonrivalrous copyrights.18 In doing so, it assumes that the 
copyright owner is entitled to payment for virtually all uses of copyrighted 
material, including those that would make the copyright holder no worse 
 
 
 13. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1984). 
 14. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 11. 
 15. Although this theory is derived from Professor Wendy Gordon’s seminal article Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1984), her original proposal did not limit fair use this much. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
1031, 1031–32 (2002). Professor Gordon argues that “it has become standard for economically-
oriented commentators to state that the accepted interpretation of copyright’s ‘fair use’ doctrine is to 
see fair use as responding to high transaction costs between copyright owner and user. It has also 
become standard to cite me for that limiting proposition . . . .” See id. She argues, however, that “the 
point of [her] original article was not to limit fair use” but to propose an explanation for why even 
nontransformative uses might also sometimes be protected as fair use. See id. See also Robert P. 
Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line 
Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–34 & n.52 (1997) (describing the transaction-cost 
account of the market failure theory as “the prevailing view” of fair use but stating that “a re-reading 
of Gordon’s article makes quite clear that this was only one of her chief insights”); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the 
Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149 (2003). Although I credit Professor Gordon for the 
insightful article that gave rise to the influential market failure theory, I feel compelled to critique the 
market failure theory as it is commonly understood in the literature, though this does not comport 
exactly with her original conception. 
 16. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 987 (critiquing the market failure theory). 
 17. See id. at 981–85. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 50–64. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/1
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off than she would have been without the use and would have no effect on 
the copyright holder’s incentives to create or distribute the work. Uses of 
copyrighted material that cause no harm to the copyright owner are, in 
economic terms, Pareto improvements.19 Such uses further the purpose of 
copyright by making the most of works of authorship without reducing the 
incentives to create those works.  
The balancing theory fares better, as it reflects an attempt to weigh the 
competing interests at stake in copyright law. Yet the balancing approach 
is problematic in its application, because it is very difficult for courts to 
engage in open-ended balancing of the values involved in copyright 
infringement cases. It is simply not possible for courts to measure or 
weigh, in individual cases, the value of enforcing a copyright against the 
value of allowing the use.  
Moreover, the balancing theory implicitly assumes that nearly every 
challenged use causes some harm to the copyright owner that must be 
outweighed by the use’s benefits to society. This assumption is both 
wrong and dangerous, because it does not force copyright owners to prove 
that they are actually worse off as a result of the defendant’s use, and it 
discriminates against personal uses that cause neither harm nor social 
benefit. Thus, although balancing is appropriate in some circumstances, it 
can be done effectively only when the concept of harm and its role in fair 
use analysis are properly understood.  
In order to serve copyright’s purpose, fair use must return to its 
historical roots as a tort doctrine that makes liability turn on proof of harm. 
Of course, it is not always easy to define what constitutes copyright harm. 
Indeed, the reason for the current circularity in fair use is that copyright 
harm is a legal construct that requires a baseline of entitlement from which 
to measure. Nonetheless, when applied correctly, a harm-based approach 
provides a coherent and equitable framework for evaluating fair use that 
serves copyright’s purpose to promote creative progress. 
In this Article, I argue that Supreme Court and other cases reflect a 
harm-based approach to fair use and develop a concept of “copyright 
harm” that is central to fair use analysis. Read together, and consistent 
with the incentive purpose of copyright, these cases define copyright harm 
as the uncompensated violation of an exclusive right that would be likely 
to have a material effect on a reasonable copyright owner’s ex ante 
decision to create or distribute the work. This definition of harm is an 
 
 
 19. A change is a Pareto improvement if it makes at least one person better off and no one else 
worse off. This is the strictest conception of economic efficiency. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12–13 (6th ed. 2003). 
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objective one that infers harm from foreseeable uses and requires proof of 
harm for less foreseeable ones. Thus, it avoids the circularity that arises 
from an abstract legal concept of harm by relating harm to the purpose of 
copyright. As such, this view of fair use helps to delineate the scope of 
copyright liability in much the same way that the elements of harm and 
proximate (legal) cause help to delineate tort liability.  
In Part II, I show that the fair use doctrine’s role historically was to 
excuse uses that cause no foreseeable harm to the copyright owner, and 
that doctrinal developments in copyright law have threatened that role. In 
Part III, I argue that a harm-based approach to fair use serves copyright’s 
purpose to promote creativity, showing why alternative theories of fair 
use, including the market failure and balancing theories, are rarely capable 
of achieving copyright’s incentive purpose. I also show how the Supreme 
Court has attempted to develop a harm-based approach to fair use. In Part 
IV, I explain how courts do or should apply the statutory fair use provision 
consistent with the harm-based approach, and I suggest some doctrinal 
changes courts must make to realize this approach fully. Foremost, I argue 
that the harm-based approach focuses on harm in fact, requiring proof or a 
meaningful likelihood that the defendant’s use supplanted the plaintiff’s 
sales or licensing revenues. Accordingly, it rejects any theory of 
“copyright dilution,” under which some courts have found “harm” where 
the defendant’s use of a copyrighted work impairs the image or 
distinctiveness of the work without causing market substitution. I also 
argue that the harm-based approach requires courts to allow defendants to 
mitigate evidence of harm to a copyright owner’s sales by showing that 
the defendant’s use also increases sales of the plaintiff’s work. 
II. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF COPYRIGHT HARM 
Historically, copyright infringement was in the nature of a tort. Indeed, 
copyright infringement claims originated as tort claims. Under the English 
Copyright Act of 1709, on which the United States based its Copyright 
Act, authors would vindicate their statutory copyrights by bringing an 
action for trespass on the case.20 Trespass on the case was the English 
common law writ used for an indirect invasion of an interest.21 Unlike the 
trespass action for direct invasions, which allowed recovery even when the 
 
 
 20. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 453 (4th ed. 2002). 
 21. See DAN B. DOBBS, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS 25–26 (2000); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 76 
(1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/1
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plaintiff suffered no harm, the action for trespass on the case required a 
showing of harm in the form of physical injury or pecuniary loss.22 
Consistent with its tort roots, early American copyright law limited 
infringement to uses of copyrighted works that caused harm to the 
copyright owner. Initially, statutory copyright protection was quite narrow, 
protecting only against close copying of the original copyrighted work.23 
Accordingly, only uses that caused or were likely to cause the copyright 
owner to lose sales of her copyrighted work were deemed infringing. It 
was this harm to the copyright owner’s foreseeable markets that was most 
likely to reduce her incentive to create or distribute the work. By finding 
liability only when such harm could be inferred from the allegedly 
infringing act, copyright law balanced the rights of owners and users and 
served its purpose to encourage creative progress.  
When the defendant used the work in a manner that was less certain to 
cause the copyright owner to lose sales, the fair use doctrine was invoked. 
In Folsom v. Marsh, the seminal case on fair use, Justice Story emphasized 
that material injury to the copyright owner was the touchstone of fair use.24 
There, Justice Story stated that drawing the line between lawful and 
unlawful uses of copyrighted works borders on “metaphysics of the law, 
where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile [sic] and refined, 
and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”25 Yet he did not try to simplify the 
task by granting the copyright owner a broad property right to control all 
uses of her work. Rather, while asserting that no precise line could be 
drawn, he stated several times that liability turns on “the degree in which 
the original authors may be injured” as a result of the alleged 
infringement.26 Specifically, it depends upon “the degree in which the use 
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of 
the original work.”27  
In Folsom, injury to the copyright owner could be inferred. In 
producing a two-volume biography of George Washington, the defendant 
copied verbatim hundreds of Washington’s letters, which had been 
collected in the plaintiff’s twelve-volume compilation of Washington’s 
 
 
 22. See DOBBS, supra note 21, at 26. 
 23. The earliest copyright statutes protected only against copying the original work and granted 
no right to control the preparation of derivative works. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 
124. 
 24. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 25. Id. at 344. 
 26. Id. at 349. 
 27. Id. at 348. 
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writings.28 Because the copied letters comprised approximately one-third 
of the defendant’s work (its “essential value”), and the defendant’s work 
served the same purpose as the plaintiff’s (to describe George Washington 
primarily through his own writings), the court found the copying was 
likely to harm the copyright owner.29 
Interestingly, Justice Story also recognized that the defendant’s 
copying created social value. He acknowledged that the defendant had 
“produced an exceedingly valuable book” and had “selected only such 
materials, as suited his own limited purpose as a biographer.”30 Moreover, 
Justice Story expressed “regret” that his finding of infringement “may 
interfere, in some measure, with the very meritorious labors of the 
defendants, in their great undertaking of a series of works adapted to 
school libraries.”31 Yet, given the clear and substantial harm to the 
copyright owner, Justice Story did not think it appropriate to balance that 
harm against the social value of the use.  
Justice Story provided four factors to guide courts in determining 
whether a use was fair. These factors remained in the common law of 
copyright until they were codified in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. At that time, Congress made clear that its inclusion of the fair use 
doctrine in the statute was intended merely to restate the common law and 
not to change the scope of fair use in any way.32 Section 107 provides: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of 
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include—  
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
 
 
 28. Id. at 345. 
 29. See id. at 349. 
 30. See id. at 348. 
 31. See id. at 349. 
 32. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (“Section 
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in 
any way.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/1
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 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.33  
In the years since Folsom, however, developments in copyright law 
have obscured the meaning and importance of harm in copyright 
infringement and fair use. As an initial matter, although Folsom apparently 
considered the fair use factors in assessing infringement, and section 107 
says that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright,” most courts now treat fair use as an affirmative defense.34 
Thus, the plaintiff is not required to prove harm as part of the infringement 
analysis; rather, the defendant ordinarily bears the burden to prove the 
absence of market harm in the fair use analysis.  
Moreover, the scope of copyright protection has increased 
dramatically, making it more difficult to determine when harm has 
occurred or is likely to occur. Copyright owners now have the right to 
control not only copying of their own works, but also the preparation of 
derivative works that “modify, transform, or adapt” the copyrighted work 
in any way. In addition, attempting to recognize the realities of modern 
copyright licensing, courts have begun to recognize as a “harm” under the 
fourth fair use factor not only lost sales caused by the defendant’s use, but 
also the lost opportunity to obtain licensing fees for uses that the copyright 
holder never even contemplated. The combination of the broad derivative 
works right with the recognition of a licensing market seems to give the 
copyright owner the right to control the use of copyrighted material in 
almost any market, whether or not the use substitutes for sales of the 
copyrighted work.35  
Given these developments, it becomes difficult to determine whether a 
defendant’s particular use has actually caused the copyright owner “harm” 
or has merely deprived her of a potential “benefit.”36 The underlying 
problem is that “harm” is an abstract legal construct. It requires reference 
to a predefined baseline of entitlement. The copyright owner’s baseline of 
entitlement clearly includes the right to profit from the sales of the 
 
 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 34. Compare Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 345–49 (assessing fair use factors as part of infringement 
analysis), with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 590 (1994) (describing fair use as 
an affirmative defense).  
 35. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 8, at 597. 
 36. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1384–84 (1989). 
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author’s own work. Thus, there is clearly “harm” to the copyright owner 
where the alleged infringer has copied the work verbatim and supplanted 
the copyright owner’s sales in the intended market. The issue is much 
harder, however, when there is no evidence that the alleged infringer has 
supplanted sales, for example, where the allegedly infringing work is not a 
market substitute for the copyright owner’s original work or a standard 
derivative work. In that case, the copyright owner typically argues that he 
or she suffered harm because the defendant could have paid her a licensing 
fee for use of the work.  
This argument can render the fair use analysis circular. On one hand, 
the copyright owner can always argue that he or she suffered harm because 
the copyright owner could have been paid a license fee to make the very 
use that is at issue in the case. In other words, the copyright owner could 
have shared in the benefits of the defendant’s use. On the other hand, if the 
use is fair, then it would seem that the law does not give the copyright 
holder control over the market for that use, and the alleged infringer was 
not required to seek a license for the use. As such, failure to obtain a 
license for the use does not constitute harm to the market for the 
copyrighted work.37 
The fallacy of assuming that a plaintiff is entitled to share in profits 
generated by a defendant might be exacerbated by a misunderstanding of 
the damages provisions of the Copyright Act. Under section 501 of the 
Act, copyright holders may obtain as damages either the copyright 
owner’s lost profits or the defendant’s earned profits.38 But this provision 
does not mean that a copyright owner suffers a legally cognizable harm 
any time another person makes a profitable use of her copyrighted work. It 
simply means that when an unauthorized use does harm the copyright 
owner, courts should require the defendant to disgorge profits to 
discourage such harmful uses.  
Professor Wendy Gordon has acknowledged that “[w]hether to call the 
author’s failure to receive revenues from particular copiers a ‘harm’ . . . 
depends on how one characterizes the author’s baseline.”39 She elaborates 
as follows: 
If the author is entitled to control all copying of her work then a 
lack of compensation from these copiers will make her worse off 
 
 
 37. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1386, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing circularity argument); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(same). See also Bohannan, supra note 8, at 597; Lemley, supra note 8, at 190–91 & nn.31–40. 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000). 
 39. See Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 36, at 1384–85. 
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than she was legally entitled to be. If “harm” is defined as the extent 
to which she is worse off in comparison with how she would have 
fared had the copier respected her copyright and paid the license 
fees the author would have demanded, then these copying activities 
done without her permission will be said to “harm” her. However, if 
she is entitled to control all copying of her work, but “harm” is 
instead defined as the extent to which she is worse off in 
comparison with how she would have fared in the defendant’s 
absence, then it will not be said that she has been “harmed” in these 
cases. One would say instead that when the copyright law allows a 
copyright proprietor to sue successfully in such circumstances, it is 
solely giving her an entitlement to share in the benefits her work 
generates.40 
Professor Gordon concludes that “it is largely irrelevant whether the 
author’s entitlement is viewed as an entitlement to be ‘free from harm’ or 
‘to share benefit.’”41  
The definition of harm in fair use is not, however, merely a matter of 
semantics. It is certainly true that the definition of harm depends on 
baselines from which to measure any lost entitlements. But determining 
the appropriate baseline of harm is serious business, and choosing the 
wrong baseline can be catastrophic. A semantic or rhetorical view of harm 
leads to the conclusion that a copyright owner may be “harmed” as a result 
of copying even when “the copying does not affect the copyright owner’s 
expected markets,” and “the revenues these copiers earn are not revenues 
the copyright owner could have earned on her own.”42 In this light, we can 
see that the issue of harm determines answers to some of the most pressing 
and controversial issues confronting copyright law today,43 including 
whether copyright owners must be compensated for uses of copyrighted 
 
 
 40. See id. at 1385. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 1384–85. 
Such a case might arise [where] the copier is a second creative artist with a valuable and 
novel conception for adapting the copyrighted work, someone who transmits the work to a 
new audience using a communications technology invented after the work was created, or 
perhaps an entrepreneur who knows of a market of which the author is ignorant. 
Id. Professor Gordon also argues that “it is appropriate that copyright should give rights beyond mere 
protection against harm (narrowly defined). Among other things, it is desirable for authors to be 
responsive to the public demand in new areas as well as established ones . . . .” See id. Yet, the cases in 
which no harm can be shown would be ones in which the copyright owner could not foresee the 
allegedly infringing use and therefore would not have been able to fulfill the public demand for that 
use. 
 43. See infra Part IV. 
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material that they could not have made or foreseen and whether harmless 
copying merely for one’s own personal benefit (rather than for the benefit 
of society) should ever be excused. 
Given that copyright’s constitutional purpose to “Promote progress” 
requires balance between copyright holders and users, and the existence of 
a doctrine like fair use whose purpose is to limit the scope of infringement, 
one cannot assume that a copyright holder’s baseline of entitlement 
includes control over all uses of her copyrighted work. It follows that one 
cannot assume that any failure to compensate for a technically infringing 
use (a violation of an exclusive right under section 106) causes legally 
cognizable harm to the copyright holder. Rather, for purposes of fair use 
analysis and copyright law generally, harm should be defined consistently 
with copyright’s purpose. Copyright law does not promote progress under 
the Patent and Copyright Clause if it prohibits uses that create personal or 
social value and do not affect a copyright holder’s incentive to create or 
distribute a work. Thus, the scope of fair use (and therefore infringement) 
should turn on whether the defendant’s use has caused or is likely to cause 
the plaintiff harm.44  
Current theories of fair use—the market failure and balancing 
theories—downplay the importance of harm. The fair use as market failure 
theory virtually eliminates the need for proof of harm. It finds fair use only 
where some instance of market failure, such as prohibitively high 
transaction costs or externalities, prevents payment for an allegedly 
infringing use, regardless of whether the use causes harm.45 The second 
theory adopts a balancing approach to fair use.46 Under this view, courts 
take harm to the copyright owner into account, but they do not always 
define harm correctly, and they tend to find fair use only where the social 
value of the use outweighs the harm.47  
 
 
 44. The Supreme Court recently recognized that fair use is also an important safeguard of First 
Amendment expression because it mediates between owners and users of copyrighted material. See 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2001) (describing fair use as one of copyright’s “built-in 
First Amendment accommodations” and holding that so long as copyright legislation maintains fair 
use and other internal safeguards of free expression, external First Amendment scrutiny ordinarily 
would not apply). In future work, I plan to explore how the copyright harm approach to fair use can 
protect and should be shaped by First Amendment concerns in copyright law. 
 45. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (citing 
Professor Gordon’s market failure theory, perhaps incorrectly, for the view that the fair use doctrine 
should apply only where market failure prevents payment or the amount that the copyright holder 
would charge for the use is near zero); Merges, supra note 15, at 130–34 & n.52. 
 46. See Lunney, supra note 11. 
 47. See id. at 981–85. 
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In the following sections, I argue that neither of these approaches to 
fair use fully achieves copyright’s purpose, and that an approach that 
focuses primarily on harm is superior in striking the necessary balance 
between copyright holders and users. I then show how the Supreme Court 
has in fact attempted to develop and apply the proposed approach in fair 
use cases. 
III. CURRENT THEORIES OF FAIR USE 
A. The Market Failure Approach 
Under the market failure theory, fair use excuses copying only where 
some instance of market failure, such as prohibitively high transaction 
costs or externalities, prevents the defendant from paying for what 
otherwise would be an economically valuable use.48 As such, the market 
failure theory implicitly adopts a property-oriented approach to copyrights 
that presumes harm from infringement in the same way that courts 
presume harm from trespass to real property.49  
Such a strict property-oriented view of copyright infringement is 
unconvincing. Unlike real property, copyrighted works are nonrivalrous 
goods: one person’s copying of a copyrighted work does not deprive the 
owner of her possession or use of the same work.50 Consequently, while 
courts may infer at least some nominal harm to a real property owner 
based on another’s trespass, courts may not always infer harm to a 
copyright owner from another’s use of her copyrighted work. Where the 
copyright owner can show that the alleged infringer supplanted sales that 
the copyright owner would have made, there is clearly harm. By contrast, 
where the alleged infringer merely profits from using the copyrighted 
 
 
 48. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 49. For a property-oriented argument against requiring harm in copyright infringement, see 
David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYR. SOC’Y OF THE USA 421 
(1983). Ladd argues that the requirement of harm “is not only unhistoric, but specious.” Id. at 425. He 
provides precious little support for this argument, however, offering mainly general observations that 
the framers of the Constitution were influenced by Locke and believed that private property should not 
be taken without just compensation. Id. at 426. To this he adds a natural-rights justification: 
“Copyright, after all, merely allows justice. It does not ‘give’ the author or the publisher anything. It 
cloaks in legal raiment the undoubted right.” Id. at 429. Thus, he concludes that “[e]very limitation on 
copyright is a kind of rate-setting.” Id. at 431. Ladd’s argument ignores consistent Supreme Court 
precedent specifically rejecting the natural rights view and adopting a positive, utilitarian approach to 
copyright that necessarily involves statutory limitations on copyrights. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“Congress [in enacting the Copyright Act] did not sanction an 
existing right, but created a new one.”); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834) (same).  
 50. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 11, at 987. 
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work in a way that the copyright owner would not or could not have done, 
there is no harm to the copyright owner. The copyright owner is no worse 
off than she would have been had the defendant not used the copyrighted 
work.  
Some technically infringing uses of copyrighted works are efficient 
because they create social benefit without causing any offsetting harm to 
the copyright owner.51 When a legal regime prevents such efficient use of 
resources, the law itself causes market failure. Because the prevailing view 
of the market failure theory does not take into account the massive market 
failure caused when copyright law is used to prevent efficient use of 
copyrighted works, it misses what is arguably the biggest market failure of 
all.  
The market failure theory conflates two issues that should be addressed 
separately. In saying that defendants must pay for any technical violation 
of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights unless market failure prevents 
transacting for permission, it establishes (1) that the copyright owner is 
entitled to payment for all uses of her copyrighted work that violate her 
exclusive rights, whether or not such uses cause her harm, and (2) that fair 
use should excuse nonpayment for such uses where transaction costs or 
other market failures prevent obtaining a license.  
The second point is undoubtedly correct. When market failure prevents 
payment for uses of copyrighted works, the use should be deemed fair. In 
that case, the copyright owner is not going to be paid for the use whether 
or not the law allows it. Accordingly, the copyright owner is no worse off 
if the defendant uses the work than if he does not. In this light, it is clear 
that market failure is not an external phenomenon that justifies fair use 
after the proper scope of copyright protection is determined. Rather, 
market failure is one basis for finding fair use because it represents a 
situation in which a copyright owner suffers no real harm as a result of the 
defendant’s allegedly infringing activity.52 Thus, the basic insight of 
market failure theory becomes a useful tool for resolving one category of 
cases under the harm-based approach to fair use. In such cases, the market 
failure theory is consistent with a harm-based theory of fair use. 
By contrast, the first point implicit in the market failure theory—that 
the copyright owner is entitled to payment for all violations of her 
exclusive rights, whether or not such uses cause her harm—is much more 
 
 
 51. Such uses are pure Pareto improvements. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 52. See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 398 (2006) (describing the market failure theory as a “[n]arrow 
version[]” of the injury-based approach to fair use). 
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controversial. The issue here cuts to the heart of copyright law as it defines 
the scope of a copyright owner’s rights. Fundamentally, the question is 
whether a copyright owner has the right only to prevent others from using 
her work in ways that cause her harm, or whether she has the right to share 
in all of the benefits that others derive from uses of her work. 
The market failure theory all but ignores the issue of harm. As 
previously discussed, it treats copyright infringement like trespass to real 
property, for which harm is presumed. But copyrights should be treated as 
property only to the extent consistent with copyright’s constitutional 
purpose to promote creative progress.53 As the Supreme Court has said, 
this constitutional provision establishes an incentive theory of copyright.54 
Property rights do not necessarily provide such incentives; they may exist 
for a variety of reasons. Indeed, one of the reasons for granting real 
property rights is the Lockean notion that people obtain natural rights in 
property when they mix their labor with the soil. The Supreme Court has 
made it clear, however, that any natural rights authors have in their 
copyrighted works as a result of their labor or creative genius are 
subservient to copyright’s incentive purpose.55 Taking the incentive theory 
seriously means that we may not assume it is desirable to grant broad 
property rights over copyrighted works, particularly given their 
nonrivalrous nature and the existence of a doctrine like fair use whose 
purpose is to limit the scope of copyright infringement claims.  
Moreover, while a property analogy might provide a common law 
reality check for a confused area of copyright law,56 the analogy between 
copyright infringement and trespass to real property is inapt and 
misleading.57 Copyright infringement is more analogous to trespass to 
 
 
 53. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges and Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and 
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000) (“Congress exceeds its authority to grant 
property rights [over copyrighted works] when those rights do not promote progress.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).  
 55. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991) 
(rejecting “sweat of the brow” doctrine as a basis for copyright protection). See also Sara K. Stadler, 
Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 433, 437 (2007) (arguing that Supreme 
Court rejected labor theory of copyrights in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) and 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
 56. Common law rules are often suggested as baselines when circularity or uncertainty arises in 
statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 55, at 469–73 (arguing that “background 
principles” residing in the common law might be used to avoid circularity that arises in assessing the 
appropriate amount of copyright protection based on the expectations of copyright owners); Bohannan, 
supra note 8, at 615 (“[The common law of copyright] provides a ready analogy for resolving the 
ambiguity between the DMCA’s prohibitions and the fair use doctrine.”). 
 57. Historically, trespass to real property has been treated as a direct invasion of an interest for 
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personal property than to trespass to real property. Indeed, the few times 
the Copyright Act characterizes the property interest in copyright 
ownership, it is as personal property. For instance, the Act states that 
copyright ownership “may . . . pass as personal property by the applicable 
laws of intestate succession.”58  
The tort of trespass to chattels provides a cause of action for 
interferences with possession of personal property.59 Yet, both case law 
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts emphasize “that some actual injury 
must have occurred in order for a trespass to chattels to be actionable.”60 
Courts have said that “[w]hile one may have no right temporarily to use 
another’s personal property, such use is actionable as a trespass only if it 
‘has proximately caused injury.’”61 Moreover, courts find the requisite 
harm only when the defendant’s use caused damage to the property and 
not merely because the defendant derived value from use of the property.62  
Thus, for present purposes, it really does not matter whether copyright 
infringement is more analogous to trespass on the case (the historical 
view) or trespass to personal property.  The important point is that either 
common law analogue to copyright infringement would require proof that 
the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff actual harm, not merely that it 
deprived her of a potential benefit.  Just as the requirement of harm in 
trespass on the case and trespass to chattels distinguishes between 
technical and actionable trespasses,63 so too a requirement of copyright 
harm in fair use should distinguish between technical violations of a 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights and actionable infringement. As such, 
 
 
which harm was presumed. Copyright infringement, by contrast, has been treated as trespass on the 
case. As such, the infringement was viewed as an indirect invasion of an interest actionable only upon 
a showing of actual harm. See supra notes 20–22. 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000). Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 
1837, 1840 (2006) (“To be sure, the Patent Act also declares that ‘patents shall have the attributes of 
personal property . . . .’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261) (2000)). 
 59. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE  LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 85–86 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 60. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 302. See also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Cal. 
App. 4th Dist. 1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218. 
 61. Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 306. 
 62. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (holding that plaintiff telephone company could 
not recover for trespass to chattels because it had suffered no actual harm where plaintiff could not 
show damage to efficient functioning of its telephone system but only that defendant profited by 
making free long-distance telephone calls). 
 63. See, e.g., Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 303 (“But while a harmless use or touching of personal property 
may be a technical trespass, an interference . . . is not actionable, under modern California and broader 
American law, without a showing of harm.” (internal citation omitted)); supra notes 20–22 and 
accompanying text (copyright infringement historically treated as trespass on the case which is 
actionable only upon proof of harm). 
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the harm-based approach to fair use gives copyright protection against 
harmful uses that are likely to affect the copyright owner’s incentives to 
create or distribute the work.  
By contrast, the market failure approach assumes that copyright holders 
are entitled to control all copying of their works and presumes harm from 
such uses. As such, it allows copyright holders to control uses that fall 
outside their intended or foreseeable markets. If copyright holders cannot 
foresee such uses, giving copyright holders control over those uses is 
unlikely to enhance ex ante incentives to create or distribute copyrighted 
works.64 In those cases, denying fair use and finding infringement 
discourages socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works with no 
offsetting benefit. 
B. The Balancing Approach 
The balancing approach fares better than the market failure approach. It 
aspires to promote progress by balancing the harm to the copyright owner, 
such as lost sales of the copyrighted work or lost licensing fees, against the 
public benefit of allowing the use, such as the enjoyment of a new work 
that builds on the copyrighted work or increased access to the copyrighted 
work.  
Yet the balancing approach is problematic because it calls for an 
undisciplined and open-ended weighing of all of the values at stake in 
copyright infringement. First, if courts are to decide fair use by balancing 
interests in every case, it is unclear whether the statutory copyright really 
gives the copyright owner anything. For instance, Professor Glynn Lunney 
argues that under the balancing approach, “[o]nly where the copyright 
owner has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that the net 
benefit to society will be greater if a use is prohibited, should a court 
conclude that the use is unfair.”65  
Thus, this approach invites courts to rethink statutory entitlements at 
the wholesale level. Indeed, under Professor Lunney’s approach, the 
defendant may invoke the fair use doctrine for almost any reason, 
including that the defendant’s use will increase unauthorized access, which 
 
 
 64. See Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 36, at 1385 nn.192–93. 
Gordon observes that “[i]t might be argued that potential revenues from unexpected uses are unlikely 
to play much of a role in the author’s pre-creation planning, and they are thus irrelevant to incentives” 
but responds that broad rights on one copyrighted work might subsidize the creation of other works by 
the same author, and that it might sometimes be difficult to draw the line on “what is or is not an 
‘expected’ use.” Id. 
 65. Lunney, supra note 11, at 977–78. 
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will almost always be true.66 Once the defendant invokes fair use, the 
copyright owner must “justify recognition of her private ownership rights” 
by proving that “the net benefit to society will be greater if a use is 
prohibited.”67 But such a requirement is tantamount to requiring individual 
copyright plaintiffs to prove that we should have a copyright system in the 
first place, and it will ordinarily not be possible for any individual plaintiff 
to make such a showing.  
Second, the balancing approach leaves courts too much discretion, 
producing incorrect and inconsistent results. When dealing with uses of 
copyrighted material, there is likely to be substantial disagreement over 
which values are at stake and how they should be measured. Consider, for 
example, parody cases. There will often be substantial disagreement over 
whether a particular parody has any social value at all. Surely there are 
people who believe society would be better off without some of the bawdy 
parodies that are the subject of copyright litigation, or at least that their 
value is not so substantial as to require copyright owners to subsidize 
them. Nor can we measure the competing “social value” of enforcing 
copyrights. Indeed, the whole of copyright law is based on the principle 
that the existence and enforcement of copyrights themselves serve the 
public interest by encouraging creativity. Without any concrete guidance 
on how to weigh these interests, courts are left to their own value 
judgments.68 It is no wonder, then, that we get conflicting results in cases 
purporting to apply the balancing approach.69 
Third, while the market failure approach systematically over-protects 
copyrights by prohibiting many harmless uses, the balancing approach 
both over- and under-protects for the same reason: neither approach pays 
sufficient attention to proof of harm. The balancing approach can under-
protect copyrights because it is virtually always possible to imagine some 
abstract social value associated with a defendant’s use of copyrighted 
material. Indeed, it is precisely because copyrighted works generate social 
value that we grant copyrights to encourage their creation. If a copyright 
 
 
 66. Id. at 977. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Madison, supra note 52, at 400 (“Even if courts have been deciding cases based on an 
unarticulated normative vision of the good, the standards that they have used . . . are just short of 
useless as substantive guides to behavior and decision-making.”). 
 69. Compare Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding little social value and therefore no fair use in alleged parody), and MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 
F.2d 180 (1981) (same), with Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding social value and therefore fair use for alleged parody). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/1
p 969 Bohannan book pages.doc 5/20/2008 11:04:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] COPYRIGHT HARM, FORESEEABILITY, AND FAIR USE 987 
 
 
 
 
owner demonstrates real harm, that harm should not be lightly dismissed 
because of some general notion of a social benefit.  
The balancing test can also over-protect copyrights. The balancing 
approach seems to assume that challenged uses typically cause some harm 
to the copyright owner that must be outweighed by a social benefit. This 
assumption is not well founded; there are many cases in which a 
defendant’s use does not cause the plaintiff to be any worse off than she 
would have been otherwise. Yet, as previously discussed, current theories 
of fair use do not always require copyright owners to prove real harm. 
Instead, they can rely on hypothetical harm that they might or might not 
suffer as the result of sales that they might or might not have made at some 
point in the future.  
To be sure, balancing cannot and should not be avoided in all cases. In 
some instances the social benefit of allowing a use clearly exceeds the 
harm, even if neither benefit nor harm can be accurately measured. Yet, 
given the problems associated with wholesale balancing, it is equally clear 
that courts must take harm more seriously in determining when and how to 
balance. Indeed, because a harm-based approach finds infringement only 
where there is proof that the copyright owner has suffered real harm and 
allows uses that do not cause such harm, it will often be the best way to 
balance the rights of owners and users. Courts should engage in further 
balancing only when there is real proof of harm to the copyright owner, 
and only when that harm is clearly outweighed by the social value in 
allowing the use. If courts engage in balancing in cases that are very close, 
they risk an unacceptably high rate of error. 
C. The Harm-Based Approach 
Under a harm-based approach, the fair use doctrine protects uses that 
technically violate the copyright holder’s exclusive rights under section 
106 but do not cause any material harm. As previously discussed, 
however, it is not always easy to determine what constitutes copyright 
harm.  Copyright harm is not purely a fact question, for it depends on a 
legal baseline of entitlement from which to measure. 
Consistent with copyright’s purpose, copyright harm should be limited 
to profits that would be likely to affect incentives to create or distribute 
copyrighted works. As one judge has explained: 
 The guiding principle of the Copyright Act is that the financial 
earnings of original works be channeled exclusively to the creators 
of the works insofar—and only insofar—as they are necessary to 
motivate the creation of original works . . . .  The copyright holder’s 
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statutory monopoly does not encompass profits from derivative 
works that the copyright holders do not themselves seek to market 
or that do not harm the value of works that the copyright holders do 
seek to market; the monopoly privileges need not include these 
profits because these profits do not function as incentives to 
prospective creators.70 
The problem is that, because the expansion of copyrights over time has 
created expectations on the part of creators, it might be argued that 
“anything less than perfect control . . . provide[s] creators with insufficient 
incentives.”71 Given the lack of empirical evidence on what motivates 
copyright owners, it could be said that more profits always lead to more 
incentives to create, and therefore that any uncompensated use of a 
copyrighted work should be viewed as a harm to the copyright owner. It 
also could be said that because some amount of unforeseeability is 
foreseeable, savvy copyright owners who cannot foresee all of the 
potential uses for their works could still bank on being compensated for 
those uses. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of argument suggests that the 
copyright owner might be entitled to control all uses of her copyrighted 
work, including uses she never would or could have dreamed of.72 But 
then copyright law would differ from virtually all other areas of law, 
which ordinarily do not provide a cause of action for purely speculative 
harms. Rather, the law ordinarily requires evidence that the plaintiff is 
demonstrably worse off as a result of the defendant’s allegedly wrongful 
act.  
Moreover, legal rules generally use an objective, reasonable person 
standard in judging human behavior. To the extent that reasonable 
copyright owners are rational economic actors, they will make marginal 
investments in creating and distributing copyrighted works based on 
expected marginal returns, not based on an unforeseeable payoff.73 The 
 
 
 70. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1409 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting). 
 71. See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 55, at 435 (“[I]ncreasingly, anything less than perfect control is 
thought to provide creators with insufficient incentive. . . . Over time, the increase of rights under 
copyright law creates expectations among creators . . . and [c]reators form incentives based on those 
expectations.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 55, at 435 (“[I]ncreasingly, anything less than perfect control is 
thought to provide creators with insufficient incentive. . . . Over time, the increase of rights under 
copyright law creates expectations among creators . . . and [c]reators form incentives based on those 
expectations.”). 
 73. This concept is known in the literature as “bounded rationality,” which refers to the idea that 
people act rationally based on the limited information they have. See, e.g., Shyam Balganesh, 
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omniscient, perfectly rational economic actor does not exist; economic 
actors have limited information and therefore cannot foresee and evaluate 
all future events or their consequences. Even if reasonable copyright 
owners are not strictly rational economic actors, they are expected to be 
ordinary people, who act with regard to ordinary, not extraordinary, 
circumstances. The reasonable copyright owner might be thrilled when her 
copyrighted work is used in some unexpected way. In all likelihood, she 
would like to share (and might even develop an ex post expectation to 
share) in any profits derived from the use. But if she is a reasonable person 
acting reasonably, she would not count on those profits in deciding ex ante 
whether to create or distribute her work.  
Thus, just as tort law requires courts to engage in substantive line-
drawing regarding the extent of liability based on what a reasonable 
person would foresee, the harm-based approach to fair use requires courts 
to do the same in copyright infringement cases. Accordingly, under the 
harm-based approach to fair use, courts should presume harm only where 
the defendant’s use usurps the copyright holder’s most foreseeable 
markets, or those markets which a reasonable copyright owner would have 
taken into account in deciding whether to create or distribute the 
copyrighted work.  For less foreseeable uses, copyright holders must be 
required to prove actual harm in order to establish infringement. A 
copyright plaintiff can prove actual harm by showing that (1) the 
defendant’s unauthorized use deprived him of sales or license fees from 
another (third-party) source, or (2) the defendant’s own failure to pay for 
the use constitutes harm because the plaintiff was actively exploiting the 
market for the use made by the defendant and, if payment were required, 
the defendant would have been more likely to pay for the use than to forgo 
it.   
For the lion’s share of cases dealing with economic injuries, the 
copyright harm approach to fair use is extremely useful. As will be shown 
later, however, this approach does not take account of noneconomic 
injuries such as damage to the image of the copyrighted work or the 
 
 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (using bounded 
rationality to argue for a “foreseeable copying” test as part of copyright infringement analysis rather 
than as part of a fair use defense); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1435, 1457 n.106 (2007). Cf. Randal C. Picker, Fair Use vs. Fair Access (Univ. of Chicago Law 
& Econ. Olin Working Paper #392, Mar. 1, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1104764 (suggesting that copyright should include temporally-staged bundles of 
rights, such as the right to publish in English now and in Mandarin later, but limiting the analysis to 
foreseeable uses). 
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reputation of the copyright owner, or simply the loss of exclusive artistic 
control of the copyrighted work. While these perceived injuries might be 
deterrents to creating or distributing copyrighted works, copyright law 
does not purport to insulate copyright owners from all interference with or 
criticism of their copyrighted works. Indeed, fair use historically has 
protected critical uses more than noncritical ones, in part because allowing 
a copyright owner to suppress criticism or expression of a different 
viewpoint would be detrimental to First Amendment interests. Moreover, 
the Copyright Act provides only very limited rights against uses that might 
harm the image of the work or the author’s reputation.74 Thus, broader 
judicial recognition of harm to an author’s reputation under the fair use 
doctrine would seem inconsistent with American copyright law 
generally.75  
The next Part discusses how the most recent Supreme Court cases on 
fair use have applied a harm-based approach. These cases establish harm 
as the touchstone of fair use, rejecting fair use when there is clear evidence 
of harm to the copyright owner, even when the defendant’s use has social 
value, and finding fair use when there is no evidence of harm or a 
meaningful likelihood of harm.  
These cases also provide guidance on what constitutes copyright harm. 
In general, they focus on harm in fact, that is, harm actually suffered or 
likely to be suffered by the copyright owner. They find harm based only 
on sales or licensing fees that the plaintiff likely would have received but 
for the defendant’s allegedly infringing acts. As such, they reject the view 
 
 
 74. The only part of the Copyright Act that protects the image or reputation of an author or work 
is section 106A, which covers moral rights. Moral rights protect primarily an author’s rights to claim 
authorship of a work and “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [a] 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  
 By contrast to the right to copy and other exclusive rights granted in section 106, the moral rights 
granted in section 106A are severely limited in scope. Moral rights apply only to “works of visual art,” 
which include paintings, sculptures, and a few other types of fine art, but not to more typical 
copyrighted works such as books, motion pictures, or any works made for hire. They apply only to the 
original works, not to copies of the works. Moreover, an author has the right to prevent modifications 
that are prejudicial to her reputation only where such modifications are intentional. In addition, only 
the original authors can assert the claims, as they may not be transferred.  
 In light of all of these qualifications, it is clear that Congress intended to create moral rights that 
are very limited in scope. To the extent that courts recognize reputation- or image-related harms to 
copyrighted works outside the carefully delineated limitations of section 106A, they thwart 
congressional intent. 
 75. Because the copyright harm model is based on incentives to create or distribute copyrighted 
works, its utility might be limited in assessing fair use claims involving the copying of works never 
intended to be published. Additional work is contemplated to determine whether the First Amendment 
concerns underlying copyright law might shape the copyright harm model of fair use in ways that 
would take account of noneconomic injuries. 
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that a copyright plaintiff is entitled to payment for all violations of her 
exclusive rights and therefore suffers a legal harm whenever a defendant 
profits from the use of her work. Moreover, the Court presumes harm 
when the defendant’s use falls within the copyright owner’s most 
foreseeable uses but requires actual proof of harm for less foreseeable 
uses. This view of fair use delineates the scope of copyright liability in 
much the same way that the elements of harm and proximate (legal) cause 
help to delineate tort liability.76  
IV. COPYRIGHT HARM AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Sony v. Universal Pictures 
Advocates of the market failure and balancing approaches to fair use 
each claim that Supreme Court case law supports their approach. They 
focus primarily on the Sony Betamax case as an example.77 Although the 
result in the Sony case is superficially consistent with both of these 
theories, the decision is best described as a harm-based approach to fair 
use.  
In Sony, the owners of copyrights in television programs sued Sony, the 
manufacturer of the Betamax home video recorder, arguing that Sony’s 
machines facilitated copyright infringement by home viewers.78 In 
evaluating the contributory infringement claim against Sony, the Supreme 
Court considered whether the viewers’ primary use of the machines—
taping programs for the purpose of “time-shifting,” or watching the 
 
 
 76. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 239–51 (1987). Landes and Posner argue that a negligent act is deemed to be a legal 
(proximate) cause of another’s harm where the probability that harm would occur without due care 
(p|v) minus the probability that harm would occur with due care (p|nv) is substantial. They argue that 
where the difference between these probabilities (p|v – p|nv) is substantial, taking care to avoid the 
harm is likely to have a significant effect in terms of avoiding the harm. In that situation, liability 
should be imposed to encourage taking precautions that have great social value. By contrast, they 
argue that where the difference between these probabilities is not substantial, there should be no 
liability because taking care is less likely to avoid the harm, and therefore other considerations such as 
the possibility of deterring socially valuable activities and litigation costs loom larger.  
 Applied to copyright law, this theory of causation suggests that harm to the copyright owner (and 
liability) should be found where there is a substantial difference between the probability that a 
copyright owner would create the copyrighted work if the alleged infringer’s use of the copyrighted 
work is permitted minus the probability that a copyright owner would create the work if the alleged 
infringer’s use of the work is not permitted (i.e., is deemed an infringing use that requires payment). 
This approach makes copyright’s purpose paramount in defining harm and the scope of fair use. 
 77. See generally Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 13; Lunney, supra note 11. 
 78. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984). 
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programs at a later time than they were broadcast—was fair use.79 By a 
very slim margin, the Court determined that such “time-shifting” was a 
noninfringing fair use, and therefore that Sony was not liable for 
contributory infringement because the machine was “capable of substantial 
non-infringing uses.”80 
Since that time, scholars have disagreed over what the Sony case stands 
for. One side argues that Sony sets forth a market failure approach to fair 
use.81 Because the verbatim copying of entire television programs 
constituted a violation of the copyright owners’ exclusive right of 
reproduction under section 106 of the Copyright Act, the home-tapers 
were legally required to obtain a license for that recording unless a defense 
such as fair use applies. But because the amount that each home-taper 
would pay to time-shift each program would be small relative to the 
transaction costs each home-taper would incur in negotiating a license 
with each copyright owner, these transactions were unlikely to occur.82 
Thus, the market for time-shifting would fail, and the time-shifting should 
be permitted as a fair use.  
Others have offered an alternative account of Sony’s approach to fair 
use. For instance, Professor Lunney has written that “[w]hen we 
reexamine Sony as it was written, we find that the market failure account 
is, at best, a one-dimensional caricature of Justice Stevens’s sensitive and 
careful attempt to understand the economic consequences of time-shifting 
in light of the evidence presented.”83 Rather, he says Sony recognizes fair 
use as the “central and vital arbiter” between the public interest in 
enforcing copyrights to encourage authors to create new works and the 
public interest in allowing others to use and build upon existing works.84 
Thus, Professor Lunney suggests that Sony reflects a balancing approach 
to fair use: 
In defining the balance between these competing public interests, 
Sony begins with a presumption in favor of fair use and a broad 
conception of the public interest that fair use protects. Merely 
increasing access to a work, even unauthorized access, represents a 
sufficient public interest to invoke the fair use doctrine. . . . Once 
the fair use doctrine is invoked, Sony places the burden squarely on 
 
 
 79. Id. at 443. 
 80. Id. at 456. 
 81. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 13. 
 82. See id. at 1628–29. 
 83. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 978–79. 
 84. See id. at 977. 
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the copyright owner to justify recognition of her private ownership 
rights. Only where the copyright owner has demonstrated by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the net benefit to society will be 
greater if a use is prohibited, should a court conclude that the use is 
unfair.85 
Although both the market failure and balancing theories are 
superficially consistent with Sony’s ultimate conclusion that time-shifting 
is fair use, neither accurately describes the Court’s reasoning. The debate 
in Sony was fundamentally about harm.86 Specifically, it was about 
whether a copyright owner must show some kind of harm to anticipated 
markets—harm that could have affected her decision to create the 
copyrighted work in the first place—or whether it is enough for liability 
that she could have shared in the benefits produced by the defendant’s 
use.87  
The majority’s analysis of fair use, written by Justice Stevens, clearly 
takes the view that the copyright owner must show harm, or at least some 
meaningful likelihood of harm.88 His point is critically important, yet it 
has been overlooked. He states as follows: 
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. 
Even copying for noncommercial purposes may impair the 
copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that Congress 
intended him to have. But a use that has no demonstrable effect 
upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work 
need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to 
create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely 
inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit. 
 Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a 
different matter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a 
copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is 
harmful, or that if it should become widespread it would adversely 
affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual present 
harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the 
 
 
 85. Id. at 977–78. 
 86. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 450–51. 
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copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage . . . . 
What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.89 
Applying this harm requirement, Justice Stevens reviewed the district 
court’s decision, looking for evidence that time-shifting was likely to 
cause any real harm to the copyright owners. He noted that in the district 
court the plaintiffs admitted they had not yet suffered any actual harm.90 
Addressing “potential future harm,” the district court made extensive 
factual findings as to whether time-shifting would reduce advertising 
revenues, television re-run audiences, or the like.91 Ultimately, Justice 
Stevens observed that “the District Court restated its overall conclusion 
several times, in several different ways. ‘Harm from time-shifting is 
speculative and, at best, minimal.’”92  
The Sony Court’s emphasis on proof of harm is inconsistent with both 
the prevailing market failure theory and the balancing theory of fair use. It 
is inconsistent with the market failure theory because that theory would 
require payment for all copying of copyrighted works—even where the 
copyright owner cannot show that she has suffered any harm as a result of 
the use—unless transaction costs are prohibitive. It would not matter 
whether the plaintiff was in a position to exploit the market or was 
otherwise harmed by the use of copyrighted material.  
By contrast, the dissent would have held that copyright owners are 
entitled to share in the benefits of all copying of their copyrighted works, 
and that their inability to do so could be said to constitute harm. The 
dissent stated: 
The development of the [VCR] has created a new market for the 
works produced by the Studios. That market consists of those 
persons who desire to view television programs at times other than 
when they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase [VCR] 
recorders to enable them to time-shift. Because time-shifting of the 
Studios’ copyrighted works involves the copying of them, however, 
the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of that new market. 
. . . Respondents therefore can show harm from [VCR] use simply 
 
 
 89. Id. (emphasis added in part) (footnotes omitted). 
 90. See id. at 425–27; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 
(C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 91. See Universal Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 439–40, 465–68. 
 92. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454 (quoting Universal Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 467). 
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by showing that the value of their copyrights would increase if they 
were compensated for the copies that are used in the new market.93  
Nor does the Sony majority apply a balancing test. It is true that Sony 
says “a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, 
or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to 
protect the author’s incentive to create,” and that “[t]he prohibition of such 
noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any 
countervailing benefit.”94 But these statements simply show that balancing 
was unnecessary because the Court found that there was no meaningful 
proof of harm to the copyright owner in the first place.  
The Sony opinion also does not suggest that once the copyright owner 
has shown some harm, a court is free to disregard that harm and find fair 
use whenever there is social value in the infringement. Indeed, the Court’s 
opinion can be seen as very deferential to the rights of copyright owners 
where harm is clear. In distinguishing between commercial and 
noncommercial uses of copyrighted works, it states broadly that “every 
commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair 
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the 
copyright . . . .”95 There is no suggestion that this presumption against fair 
use protection for commercial uses was based on a balancing of interests. 
Rather, the reason Sony says that fair use is less available for commercial 
uses is that when (as in Sony) entire works are copied verbatim for 
commercial purposes, such uses are more likely to cause harm to 
copyright owners.96 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the Court clarified 
that Sony did not establish a “hard evidentiary presumption” against fair 
use for commercial uses and stated that “what Sony said simply makes 
common sense: when a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of 
the entirety of an original, it clearly . . . serves as a market replacement for 
it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original will 
occur.”97 
Thus, Sony’s fair use doctrine does not reflect a market failure 
approach in which courts find fair use only if market failure prevents the 
defendant from paying for her use of copyrighted material, whether or not 
the copyright owner suffers any harm as a result of the infringement. Nor 
 
 
 93. Sony, 464 U.S. at 497–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 450–51. 
 95. Id. at 451. 
 96. See id. at 451 (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair 
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright . . . .”). 
 97. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994). 
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does Sony balance proven harm to a copyright owner against some “broad 
conception of the public interest.”98 Rather, Sony takes a middle position 
that emphasizes proof of harm in fair use analysis. Under this approach, 
courts will find fair use where a defendant’s use of copyrighted material, 
while technically a violation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, 
causes no meaningful harm to the copyright owner of a kind that is likely 
to affect incentives to create copyrighted works. 
B. Harper & Row v. The Nation  
More recent Supreme Court decisions, such as Harper & Row v. The 
Nation, also embrace a harm-based approach to fair use.99 In Harper & 
Row, the defendant obtained a purloined copy of President Ford’s 
manuscript of A Time to Heal, which was about to be published.100 The 
defendant published important excerpts dealing with the pardon of 
President Nixon in its news magazine.101 There was evidence that, because 
the defendant “scooped” the story, Time Magazine cancelled a contract for 
prepublication excerpts of the book and refused to make final payment.102  
The defendant argued that its copying was fair use because its purpose 
was to report on a newsworthy matter of high public importance.103 The 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument and noted that the fourth 
 
 
 98. See Lunney, supra note 11, at 977. 
 99. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The Court’s approach to fair use in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 
(1990) is very similar to its approach in Harper & Row. Stewart is not analyzed in depth here because 
the fair use defense was a relatively minor issue in the case. Nevertheless, it clearly reflects a harm-
based approach to fair use. In Stewart, the owner of the copyright in the short story It Had to Be 
Murder sued the owners of the movie Rear Window, which was based on the short story, for copyright 
infringement. Id. at 212–13. The original owner of the copyright in the short story had authorized the 
creation of the defendant’s motion picture during the initial term of copyright, but the author died 
before the renewal term vested in him, and the renewal term vested in a trust. Id. at 212. The executor 
of the trust, as plaintiff, argued that by re-releasing the movie for public viewing during the 
copyright’s renewal term without permission, the defendants were liable for copyright infringement. 
Stewart, 495 U.S. at 211–13. After holding that the statute did not entitle the defendants to continue to 
exploit their derivative work during the renewal term without permission, the Court briefly considered 
the defendants’ argument that re-release of the motion picture constituted fair use. The Court stated: 
The fourth factor [market harm] is the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor. The 
record supports the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that re-release of the film impinged on the 
ability to market new versions of the story. Common sense would yield the same conclusion. 
. . . This case presents a classic example of an unfair use: a commercial use of a fictional story 
that adversely affects the story’s adaptation rights. 
Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 100. 471 U.S. at 542. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542. 
 103. Id. at 555–56. 
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fair use factor, which considers harm to the market for the copyrighted 
work, “is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”104 
The Court also agreed with the trial court that there was “not merely a 
potential but an actual effect on the market” because “Time’s cancellation 
of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay . . . were the direct effect 
of the infringement.”105 The Court emphasized that “[r]arely will a case of 
copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of actual 
damage.”106 
Although the result in Harper & Row is consistent with the market 
failure approach because transaction costs did not prevent negotiation of a 
license for the use, the decision is best described as a harm-based approach 
to fair use. The market failure approach to fair use does not turn on proof 
of harm, yet Harper & Row explicitly states that harm to the copyright 
owner is the most important inquiry in fair use analysis.  
Moreover, the case does not reflect a balancing approach either. 
Indeed, it was the majority’s focus on copyright harm and its refusal to 
balance interests that the dissent criticized most. The dissent lamented the 
majority’s “exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use” which 
protects “the copyright owner’s economic interest” at the expense of “[t]he 
progress of arts and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an 
enlightened citizenry . . . .”107 Thus, the dissent argued that despite the 
harm to the copyright owner, the defendant’s purpose, which it 
characterized as news reporting on a matter of historical importance, 
benefitted the public and therefore should be deemed fair.108  
In truth, however, the Harper & Row decision highlights the perils 
involved in wholesale balancing of the interests at stake in copyright cases 
and shows that the harm approach, when properly applied, can actually 
serve the public interest. The majority points out that “[a]ny copyright 
infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to the 
copyrighted work.”109 Yet, the statutory protections of the Copyright Act 
are also intended to serve the public interest by giving an economic 
incentive to create copyrighted works. As the Court observed, “If every 
 
 
 104. Id. at 566. 
 105. Id. at 567. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 590–91 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Like criticism and all other purposes Congress 
explicitly approved in § 107, news reporting informs the public . . . . In light of the explicit 
congressional endorsement in § 107, the purpose for which Ford’s literary form was borrowed strongly 
favors a finding of fair use.”). 
 109. Id. at 569. 
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volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a 
competing publisher, . . . the public [soon] would have nothing worth 
reading.”110  
Specifically, the Court showed that where there is clear evidence of 
harm, it is not always appropriate to balance that harm against the social 
value of the defendant’s use. Thus, where the defendant’s use causes harm 
by supplanting the copyright owner’s own attempts to enter the market for 
socially beneficial uses of a copyrighted work, that harm will not be 
weighed against the abstract public interest in allowing the defendant to 
copy for the same socially beneficial purposes. If copyrights have any 
legitimacy, it is when they protect against unauthorized copying that 
results in a demonstrable loss of profits that the copyright owner can prove 
she would have had but for the defendant’s infringement. Although that 
harm might sometimes be balanced against the social value of the 
defendant’s use, Harper & Row shows that it will not be excused simply 
because it may be said that there is some abstract social value associated 
with that general type of use.  
C. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., also reflects a harm-based approach. In Campbell, the 
rap group 2 Live Crew asked Acuff-Rose Music, the owner of the 
copyright in Roy Orbison’s song Pretty Woman, for permission to make a 
rap version of the song.111 When the music company refused, the group 
produced the song anyway.112 The rap song borrowed the opening line, 
basic melody, and the characteristic guitar riff of the original song, but 
substituted derogatory and sexually suggestive lyrics that ridiculed the 
romantic sentiment of the original lyrics.113 As such, the new song would 
have constituted an infringing derivative work if not saved by the fair use 
doctrine. In considering the fair use argument, the Supreme Court held that 
the use was a parody of the original.114 Its fair use analysis strongly 
indicated that the use was fair, but it remanded the case for further findings 
on the issue of harm to derivative markets.115 
 
 
 110. Id. at 559 (citations omitted). 
 111. 510 U.S. at 572 (1994). 
 112. Id. at 573. 
 113. Id. at 588, 583. 
 114. Id. at 583. 
 115. Id. at 593–94. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss5/1
p 969 Bohannan book pages.doc 5/20/2008 11:04:00 AM  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] COPYRIGHT HARM, FORESEEABILITY, AND FAIR USE 999 
 
 
 
 
The Court’s fair use analysis in Campbell reached two conclusions that 
are of importance here. First, the Court held that 2 Live Crew’s purpose 
was to make a parody of the original.116 The Court held that parody of a 
copyrighted work is obviously transformative and deserving of protection 
under the fair use doctrine to the same extent as other forms of 
commentary or criticism.117  
However, the Court distinguished between parody and satire, holding 
that satire is not as deserving of protection under the fair use doctrine.118 
The Court observed that parody is commentary on a particular work, 
whereas satire is broader commentary on a genre of works or society at 
large that “has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original 
composition.”119 The Court explained that when a copyrighted work is 
used for purely satirical purposes, “the claim to fairness in borrowing from 
another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other 
factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.”120 The Court 
conceded, however, that parody of a copyrighted work often merges with 
satire of society, and therefore it would often be difficult to distinguish 
between the two.121 It attempted to reduce the likelihood that parody 
would be mistaken for satire by creating a safe harbor for parody. 
Therefore, while concluding that the parodic content of 2 Live Crew’s 
song was probably not great, the Court found it sufficient that the “song 
reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing 
it, to some degree.”122  
Second, the Court held that market harm under the fourth factor does 
not include the loss of sales or license fees for parodies of the copyrighted 
work. The Court explained that market harm includes harm only in those 
markets that copyright owners “would in general develop or license others 
to develop,” and that copyright owners would not ordinarily license others 
to make fun of their works.123 In addition, the Court held that the parodic 
song would not supplant sales of the original song, so there was no harm 
 
 
 116. Id. at 583. 
 117. Id. at 579 (“Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to transformative value 
. . . . Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding light 
on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”). 
 118. Id. at 581. 
 119. Id. at 580, 581 n.15. 
 120. Id. at 580. 
 121. Id. at 581 (“[P]arody often shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative 
artifacts . . . .”). 
 122. Id. at 583. 
 123. Id. at 592. 
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to the market for the original song.124 However, because copyright owners 
also control markets for derivative works that are based on the copyrighted 
work, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination 
as to whether 2 Live Crew’s song harmed the market for nonparody rap 
versions of Pretty Woman.125 
The Campbell decision is consistent with a harm-based approach to fair 
use. The Court’s decision attempts to clarify which types of uses cause 
harm that copyright law should recognize and which ones do not. First, the 
Court held that fair use analysis does not consider harm due to 
“disparagement” but only harm due to “displacement.”126 The Court 
explained that “when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills 
demand for the original, it does not produce harm cognizable under the 
Copyright Act.”127 Thus, “the role of the courts is to distinguish between 
‘[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright 
infringement[, which] usurps it.’”128 The Court also said that because 
copyright owners do not typically exploit (and are not in a good position to 
exploit) the market for parodies and other criticism of their works, the 
licensing fee the copyright owners could have obtained for parody does 
not count as a “harm” for purposes of fair use analysis.129  
Second, the Court’s distinction between satire and parody reflects the 
view that copyright owners are in a better position to exploit the market 
for satirical uses of their works than for parodic uses. This is because 
when a work is used purely for satirical purposes, the “target” of the use is 
society rather than the copyrighted work itself, and the copyrighted 
expression is merely the vehicle (or the “weapon”) for conveying a 
message unrelated to the copyrighted work.130 For this reason, copyright 
owners may have a greater and more legitimate expectation to control uses 
of their work for purely satirical purposes.  
Third, the Court recognized that the defendant’s parodic use could 
potentially cause harm to markets that the copyright owner would be 
entitled to control, such as the market for nonparody rap versions of the 
song. At oral argument, counsel for Acuff-Rose Music referenced 
 
 
 124. Id. at 593. 
 125. Id. at 593–94. 
 126. Id. at 592. 
 127. Id. at 591–92. 
 128. Id. at 592 (internal citations omitted). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 152–53 (arguing that copyright owners might be less 
willing to license the use of their copyrighted work as a “target” than they would to license its use as a 
“weapon”). 
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anecdotal evidence of a market for rap versions of popular music.131 The 
Court remanded the case so that the district court could determine whether 
this was a likely market or whether Acuff-Rose was attempting to exploit 
this market.132 
Moreover, the Campbell decision is inconsistent with both the market 
failure and balancing approaches. The Court’s decision that 2 Live Crew’s 
parody was likely a fair use was not based on prohibitive transaction costs 
that prevented the rap group from compensating Acuff-Rose for the use. 2 
Live Crew had, in fact, contacted Acuff-Rose to ask for permission, and 
Acuff-Rose could have granted permission as easily as it rejected it. 
Transaction costs were no barrier to their negotiation.  
Although it is possible the Court thought there was market failure 
because the parody created external social benefits that could not be 
internalized in the negotiations between the two parties, this is a poor 
explanation of the Court’s reasoning. The externalities argument is a 
slippery slope because once externalities are taken into account they are 
everywhere. It is true that a parody of a copyrighted work creates external 
benefits to society, but so does satire. Moreover, giving copyright owners 
control over uses of their works also creates social benefits. This is, after 
all, why copyright law encourages the creation of copyrighted works. 
Although it would be wrong to give copyright owners control over 
parodies of their works, this is not due to market failure. 
In addition, while the Campbell Court stated that fair use requires “a 
sensitive balancing of interests,”133 the decision is not defensible under a 
balancing theory. In particular, the Court’s distinction between parody and 
satire runs contrary to the balancing approach. Because a balancing 
approach takes into account the social value of the defendant’s use, it 
would seem perverse to privilege parody of an individual copyrighted 
work over satirical commentary on broader social issues of arguably 
greater public value.134  
Some lower court cases are illustrative. In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., Alice Randall was sued because she wrote a novel entitled The 
 
 
 131. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 132. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593–94. 
 133. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (C.D. Cal. 1979)). 
 134. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 311–12 (1993) (arguing against Landes and 
Posner’s view that using the copyrighted work as a “target” is fair use whereas using it as a “weapon” 
is not, on the ground “that ‘weapon’ cases are [arguably] more deserving of fair use protection since 
they presumably serve the goal of promoting criticism of and commentary on larger social issues and 
values” (some internal quotations omitted)). 
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Wind Done Gone that ridiculed Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind 
by describing the story and characters from a slave girl’s point of view.135 
Randall’s novel should not be viewed as more valuable if it is deemed to 
comment solely on Mitchell’s novel than if it is deemed to comment solely 
on aspects of the antebellum South—including interracial relationships 
and the injustice of slavery—that Mitchell’s novel ignores. Likewise, in 
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, the defendant used an 
image of the Cat in the Hat and mimicked Dr. Seuss’s style in writing a 
book that ridiculed the O.J. Simpson murder case.136 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the defendant’s use was not fair because it was a satire of the 
Simpson case and not a parody of the Dr. Seuss books themselves.137 Yet, 
under the balancing approach, it would seem that commentary on the most 
controversial murder case in decades (and the justice system’s 
mishandling of that case) should weigh heavier than criticism of a book of 
children’s rhymes.  
The point here is not to defend Campbell’s parody/satire distinction, 
but simply to show that it is difficult to square much of the Campbell 
opinion with the balancing approach to fair use.  Rather, the central focus 
of Campbell is on identifying the harm that should be counted in fair use 
analysis. It includes the harm resulting from market substitution and 
excludes the harm resulting from criticism, and then observes that satire is 
more likely to cause market substitution than parody. Ultimately, the court 
remanded for further findings related to harm in derivative markets. 
Although the decision might leave open the possibility that such harm 
could be balanced against the social value of the use, the decision indicates 
that a proper focus on harm is a precondition to balancing. 
V. TOWARD A HARM-BASED THEORY OF FAIR USE  
As the foregoing shows, the Supreme Court has taken an essentially 
harm-based approach to fair use. Thus, the Court has said that the fourth 
fair use factor, which considers harm to the market for the copyrighted 
work, “is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,”138 
and commentators have observed that courts typically treat the other three 
fair use factors merely as proxies for determining whether harm under the 
 
 
 135. See 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 136. 109 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 137. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1401. 
 138. Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
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fourth factor is likely.139 As the following subsections show, courts often 
apply the four fair use factors consistently with the harm-based approach, 
usually finding liability for uses that cause actual or foreseeable harm in 
the form of lost sales or licensing fees and fair use where no such harm 
can be shown or inferred. In other cases, however, the fair use analysis is 
not entirely consistent with a harm-based approach. This Part will show 
how courts generally have interpreted the statutory fair use factors using a 
harm-based approach, as well as offer suggestions for interpretation that 
would fully realize such an approach. 
A. First Factor: Purpose or Character of the Use 
The first factor of the fair use analysis, purpose and character of the 
defendant’s use, focuses on three aspects of the defendant’s use. Arguably, 
the most important aspect is whether the use is transformative. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he central purpose of this investigation 
is to see . . . whether the new work merely supersede[s] the objects of the 
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message.”140 The Court has held that because the purpose of copyright law 
is to encourage creative works, transformative works are entitled to greater 
protection under the fair use doctrine than works in “which the alleged 
infringer merely uses [the copyrighted work] to get attention or to avoid 
the drudgery in working up something fresh.”141  
Another aspect that courts consider when characterizing the purpose 
and character of the defendant’s use is whether it is commercial in 
nature.142 The conventional wisdom is that commercial uses are less fair 
than noncommercial uses, though the cases are sometimes unclear on the 
precise role commerciality plays. Some courts have also considered a third 
aspect of the defendant’s use, namely, whether the defendant’s use was a 
 
 
 139. See, e.g., Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, supra note 8, at 188 
(“Transformativeness and the extent of the taking matter for fair use on this analysis, but primarily as a 
secondary indicator of what the doctrine really cares about: whether the use substitutes for the 
copyrighted work and so is likely to cost the copyright owner a sale.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 
2, at 153–57 (discussing the distinction between parody and satire in terms of whether the use 
substitutes for the original work). 
 140. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 579 (1994) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 
F.Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)) (internal citations omitted). 
 141. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. 
 142. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000). 
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“personal” use.143 Typically, a use is characterized as “personal” if it is 
both noncommercial and nontransformative.144  
The following sections show how these three types of uses are and 
should be addressed under a harm-based approach to fair use. 
1. Transformative Uses 
a. Transformativeness Generally 
Determining whether a use is transformative is a very important 
element of fair use analysis. Generally speaking, courts are much more 
likely to find fair use for transformative uses. Yet, there is no precise 
definition of what constitutes a transformative use. Section 107, the 
statutory fair use provision, does not use the term “transformative” in any 
of its four factors.145 It states in the preamble, however, that “the fair use 
of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.”146 Courts have characterized these illustrative fair uses as 
“transformative.”147 Accordingly, when courts consider the first statutory 
factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” they use the statute’s 
illustrative uses as a baseline for assessing whether a challenged use is 
transformative.148  
Interpreting transformativeness in light of the statute’s illustrative fair 
uses, many courts say that a transformative use is one that produces social 
benefits. In Campbell, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that “parody 
has an obvious claim to transformative value” because “it can provide 
social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, 
creating a new one.”149 Justice Blackmun made a similar point in his Sony 
dissent when he said that scholarly uses of copyrighted material are 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 & n.40 
(discussing personal uses of copyrighted material).  
 144. See id. at 455 n.40 (distinguishing between “productive” uses and “personal” uses).  
 145. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The term came from Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, supra 
note 9, at 1111 (arguing that fair use should depend primarily on whether the defendant’s use was 
“transformative”).  
 146. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 147. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 579 (1994). 
 148. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (comparing parody to “other forms of comment and 
criticism”). 
 149. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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privileged because, unlike “ordinary” uses, they create “external benefits 
from which everyone profits.”150 
This view of transformative uses would seem to support the balancing 
approach to fair use. Transformative uses are deemed fair, the argument 
goes, because they create benefits to society that outweigh the harm to the 
copyright owner. Many courts and commentators seem to accept this 
view.151  
However, close analysis of the case law on transformative uses 
challenges the analytical integrity and robustness of the “social benefit” 
account of transformative uses and, by extension, the balancing approach 
to fair use. This analysis shows that courts frequently do not decide 
whether a defendant’s use of a copyrighted work is transformative based 
on the social benefits it creates or by balancing these social benefits 
against harm to the copyright owner. Rather, they find that the defendant’s 
use is transformative if it changes the work or its purpose in a way that 
does not threaten to harm the copyright owner by supplanting sales in her 
intended markets. Moreover, while the balancing approach might explain 
some cases in which courts find that the defendant’s use is transformative, 
it is less effective at explaining cases finding no transformativeness. The 
harm-based approach helps to explain both sets of cases.  
In the first set of cases, the court finds that the challenged use is 
transformative where there is no likelihood of harm to the copyright owner 
in her foreseeable markets. Parody cases provide a classic example. For 
instance, in Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the defendant’s photographs of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
Barbie doll were transformative parodies.152 The court explained that in 
some of the photos, “Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed by 
domestic life in the form of kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying 
her well known smile, disturbingly oblivious to her predicament.”153 In 
other photos, Barbie is shown as a “nude doll in sexually suggestive 
contexts.”154 The court held that the photographs were strongly 
transformative, saying “[i]t is not difficult to see the commentary that [the 
defendant] intended or the harm that he perceived in Barbie’s influence on 
gender roles and the position of women in society.”155  
 
 
 150. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477–78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 151. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 
801, 806 (9th Cir. 2003); Lunney, supra note 11; Madison, supra note 52. 
 152. 353 F.3d at 802–03. 
 153. Mattel, 353 F.3d at 802. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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Thus, the court suggested that the defendant’s photographs were 
transformative because they provided social benefit through criticism. 
Significantly, however, the court also found that the defendant’s critical 
changes to the original copyrighted work made it a poor substitute for the 
original work in its intended markets.156 Indeed, the court found that the 
defendant’s “work could only reasonably substitute for a work in the 
market for adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie,” and that it was 
“safe to assume that Mattel will not enter such a market or license others 
to do so.”157 Accordingly, the court found no harm to the copyright 
owner.158 Ultimately, the court decided to apply a balancing test to the fair 
use issue. After it had “balanced” the factors, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s use was fair because it “had no discernable impact on Mattel’s 
market,” while “the benefits to the public in allowing such use . . . are 
great.”159  
Yet, it is clear that once the Mattel court properly considered the harm 
issue, balancing became unnecessary. The court really did not need to 
require social value or balance that value against anything, because there 
was no harm to the copyright owner on the other side of the scale. This is 
frequently true in cases involving transformative uses.160 The more the 
defendant changes the meaning, message, or purpose of a work, the less 
likely the use is to substitute for the copyright owner’s work or its most 
foreseeable derivatives. Although it is still possible to characterize this as 
“balancing”—albeit a very easy case in which there is nothing on one side 
of the scale—this approach essentially collapses into a pure harm-based 
approach in which transformativeness turns on whether or not there is 
harm. The reference to balancing merely reflects the point made 
throughout this piece that there is social benefit in allowing people to use 
copyrighted material when the use causes no harm to the copyright owner.  
The second set of cases also shows that transformativeness does not 
turn on whether the defendant’s use is socially beneficial. In these cases, 
courts find that the defendant’s use is not transformative despite the 
apparently socially beneficial nature of the use. Indeed, courts do not 
necessarily decide that a use is transformative even when it falls within 
one of the categories listed in section 107. Yet, these categories (including 
 
 
 156. Id. at 806. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. See also, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701, 724–25 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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comment, criticism, news reporting, research, etc.) represent paradigmatic 
socially beneficial uses.  
For instance, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court did not find a 
transformative use where The Nation magazine published excerpts from 
President Ford’s soon-to-be-published memoirs, even though the use 
clearly constituted news reporting. 161 Likewise, in American Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, the Second Circuit refused to find a transformative use 
where Texaco scientists copied scientific journal articles, even though the 
articles were relevant to their research.162  
Thus, courts do not decide whether a use is transformative based 
generally on whether the type of use may be labeled as socially beneficial. 
Rather, courts determine transformativeness based on the extent to which a 
challenged use changes the meaning, function, or purpose of the 
copyrighted work. In other words, a use has to be transformative relative 
to the copyright owner’s use, not just socially beneficial in the abstract. 
Courts often conflate these two definitions, saying a use is transformative 
because it adds new meaning or message, thereby creating social value. 
But these two definitions are not always consistent. In Harper & Row, the 
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s purpose was not just to report the 
news, but also to scoop the story of President Ford’s memoirs before 
Time’s licensed article hit the stands.163 Similarly, in Texaco, the court 
acknowledged that Texaco’s ultimate purpose in copying the journal 
articles was to conduct research, but held that the researchers’ immediate 
purpose was to create archival copies for their individual offices. Because 
Texaco’s purpose in buying authorized subscriptions to the journals was to 
keep archival copies in its library, the court held that Texaco’s 
unauthorized creation of additional copies for the same purpose was not 
transformative.164 
While transformative uses do typically benefit the public, the primary 
question is whether a use is sufficiently different from the copyright 
owner’s use of the work that it is unlikely to cause the copyright owner 
economic harm. When a copyright owner’s intended or most foreseeable 
markets include news reporting, research, or other socially beneficial 
markets, courts do not ignore potential harm to the copyright owner’s sales 
 
 
 161. Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (observing that 
“[a]ny copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to the 
copyrighted work”). 
 162. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 924–25 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 163. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568. 
 164. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 924–25. 
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on the ground that the defendant’s use of the work in those core markets is 
socially beneficial. The copyright owner’s work itself serves the public 
interest. The defendant’s use of the work—even for socially beneficial 
purposes—is likely to supplant the copyright owner’s sales, causing harm 
to the copyright owner that is likely to decrease incentives to create such 
works. Moreover, because the defendant is merely attempting to exploit 
the same socially beneficial markets as the copyright owner, there is no 
reason to believe that allowing the defendant’s use will result in a net 
social benefit. 
Thus, in determining whether a challenged use of copyrighted material 
is transformative, courts often do not and should not focus generally on 
whether the use is socially beneficial. Rather, under the harm-based 
approach, the defendant’s use is transformative if it changes the work or 
its purpose in a way that does not threaten to supplant the copyright 
owner’s intended or most foreseeable markets. When a challenged use 
threatens material harm to the copyright owner’s markets, courts should 
find that the use is not transformative, even if it would seem to be socially 
beneficial. Conversely, a court’s finding of “transformativeness” will often 
be equivalent to a finding of “no-harm,” because the defendant’s changes 
to the meaning or purpose of the copyrighted work render it a poor 
substitute for the copyright owner’s work.  
b. Parody and Satire 
As previously discussed, the Campbell Court held that parody is 
entitled to greater fair use protection than satire because copyright owners 
are in a better position to exploit the market for satirical uses of their 
works than for parodic uses. Thus, the Campbell Court’s distinction 
between parody and satire in determining transformativeness is 
theoretically consistent with a harm-based approach to fair use.  
In practice, however, this distinction can be very problematic. It can be 
nearly impossible to draw the line between parody and satire. This is 
especially true for uses of famous copyrighted works, which are often the 
subject of parody and satire cases.165 When a copyrighted work is so 
 
 
 165. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (holding that rap 
version of popular song “Pretty Woman” “reasonably could be perceived” as parody); Suntrust Bank 
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing lower court’s ruling that 
novel The Wind Done Gone was not parody of famous novel Gone With the Wind); Dr. Seuss Enter., 
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1402–03 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding book written in 
style of The Cat in the Hat telling the story of the O.J. Simpson murder case was satire, not parody); 
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famous that it nearly defines a genre or historical period, or is sui generis, 
it borders on the metaphysical to discern whether the allegedly infringing 
work comments on the copyrighted work itself or on the genre or period it 
represents.  
For example, any parody of Gone With the Wind would seem to satirize 
the antebellum South, because images of Gone With the Wind practically 
define that era in the minds of many readers.166 Moreover, where a new 
work seeks to comment on the historical inaccuracy of a famous work like 
Gone With the Wind, it is inevitable that the author will also “provide a 
more balanced view” of history in the process.167  
The Campbell case also shows how difficult it is to determine whether 
a use constitutes a parody, a satire, or neither. The district court granted 
summary judgment to 2 Live Crew, holding that the use was a parody. The 
Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that it had difficulty discerning the element 
of parody in the defendants’ song. The Supreme Court then reversed the 
Sixth Circuit and remanded,168 holding that the use reflected at least some 
marginally parodic content: 
 While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic element 
here, we think it fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably 
could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, 
to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a 
man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy 
demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. 
The later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the 
original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores 
the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is 
this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s 
choice of parody . . . .169  
 
 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding sexually humorous version of song 
Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy not parody). 
 166. As The Wind Done Gone author Alice Randall has said, “[Gone With the Wind]—the book, 
the movie, the costumes, the quips—has reached the status of myth in our culture. It is more powerful 
than history, because it is better known than history.” See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 
F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (quoting the “Conversation with Alice Randall” at the end of 
Randall’s novel). 
 167. See Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (“Many of the critical elements of The Wind Done 
Gone attack Gone With the Wind but, as explained by Ms. Randall, the new work also seeks to, and 
does provide, a more balanced view of the antebellum South.”). 
 168. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d, 972 
F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 169. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
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The harm-based approach to fair use provides guidance to courts on 
how to deal with parody and satire cases. First, it helps courts to draw a 
functional line between parody and satire. Under Campbell, copyright 
harm occurs when a use substitutes for the original copyrighted work, not 
when a use suppresses the demand for it through criticism. Because 
copyright holders are not in a good position to exploit the market for 
criticism of their own work—and arguably should expect such criticism in 
a robust marketplace of ideas—copyright holders do not control the 
market for works that are critical of their own. Accordingly, if the 
defendant’s use criticizes either the copyrighted work or social views that 
the copyright owner might like to protect from criticism, then the court 
should find that the defendant’s use falls within Campbell’s safe harbor for 
parody.170  
Second, the harm-based approach sheds light on the appropriate 
treatment of satirical uses. While Campbell held that fair use protects 
parody more than it protects satire, it did not hold that satire is never fair 
use. Indeed, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether the lack 
of compensation for satirical uses of copyrighted works would constitute 
harm to a copyright owner’s foreseeable markets.171 Thus, even if a court 
finds that a use is purely satirical, it still must decide whether the use 
causes copyright harm. This determination requires the court to decide 
whether harm may be inferred or whether it must be proved, depending on 
how foreseeable the satirical use is and how likely it is to supplant the 
copyright owner’s markets. 
2. Commercial Uses 
The second inquiry in assessing the purpose and character of a use in 
the fair use analysis is whether the use is commercial in nature. The 
conventional wisdom is that commercial uses are less fair than 
noncommercial uses. In fact, however, the case law is unclear on the 
significance of commerciality in the analysis. 
In Sony, the Supreme Court suggested that commercial uses are 
presumptively unfair.172 The Campbell Court subsequently retreated from 
that position, however, stating that although commerciality weighs against 
 
 
 170. Id. (holding that a use is protected as parody if it “reasonably could be perceived as 
commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree”). 
 171. See id. at 592 n.22 (“We express no opinion as to the derivative markets for works using 
elements of an original as vehicles for satire or amusement, making no comment on the original or 
criticism of it.”). 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 94–97. 
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a finding of fair use, it does not create a presumption.173 Moreover, 
Campbell suggests that the commercial nature of a use does not weigh 
against fair use unless the use is likely to supplant sales of the copyrighted 
work or its derivatives.174 The Court explained that harm may not be 
inferred from a commercial use when the use alters the work in such a way 
that it is unlikely to compete with the original work in the marketplace. 
The Court added that most of the examples of transformative uses listed in 
section 107 “are generally conducted for profit in this country.”175  
Thus, Campbell suggests that the commerciality factor should not 
possess independent significance in the analysis. Rather, consistent with a 
harm-based approach to fair use, it is merely an indicator of whether the 
defendant’s use is likely to cause harm to the copyright owner.176 As the 
Sony case reflects, the commerciality factor allows a presumption of harm 
where the defendant copies the copyrighted work closely for commercial 
gain. In these cases, harm to the copyright owner is likely, and fair use 
ordinarily should be denied.  
A few courts have held that the commercial nature of a use weighs 
against fair use, regardless of harm. These courts might have embraced, at 
least to some extent, the market failure theory for commercial uses. The 
prevailing view of the market failure theory is particularly inhospitable to 
commercial uses. Commercial users are likely to profit more from using 
copyrighted works and are also in a better position to overcome 
transaction costs. Yet, in many cases, commercial uses cause no more 
harm to the copyright owner than do noncommercial uses. Moreover, 
commercial uses often benefit the public more than personal uses do, 
because they result in more widespread public access to the copyright 
owner’s original work or the defendant’s improvement of the original 
work. As such, the market failure theory’s treatment of commercial uses 
discourages progress and leads to gross inefficiencies. 
 
 
 173. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584: 
The language of the statute makes clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose 
of a work is only one element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character . . . . 
Congress resisted attempts to narrow the ambit of this traditional enquiry by adopting 
categories of presumptively fair use, and it urged courts to preserve the breadth of their 
traditionally ample view of the universe of relevant evidence. 
 174. See id. at 583–85. 
 175. See id. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
 176. Justice Ginsburg raised the issue of whether the commercial nature of a use should be given 
independent weight in a question to an advocate during the oral argument in the Campbell case. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at *14, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1993 WL 757656 (Nov. 9, 
1993). 
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For example, courts sometimes reject fair use claims for uses that result 
in new commercial products177 even when there is no likelihood that the 
new product will substitute for the copyrighted work or its foreseeable 
derivatives. In many of these cases, courts deny fair use protection for 
commercial uses by saying that the use is not transformative, even when it 
clearly transforms the original. In the Wind Done Gone case, the district 
court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction against 
distribution of the defendant’s book, rejecting the defendant’s claim that 
the book was a transformative fair use.178 The court “conclude[d] that 
while The Wind Done Gone in part criticizes Gone With the Wind, the 
book’s overall purpose is to create a sequel to the older work and provide 
Ms. Randall’s social commentary on the antebellum South.”179  
The district court in the Wind Done Gone case failed to recognize that 
the transformative purpose of Randall’s book is not primarily to expose 
the reality of the antebellum South, but to expose how Gone With the 
Wind diverged from that reality. Rather than writing a direct historical 
critique of the original book, however, Randall chose to write another 
book that juxtaposes Gone With the Wind’s glamorous story of gallant 
men and charming women during the Civil War period with a second story 
of a black girl’s impressions of prejudice, slavery, and miscegenation 
during the same period. The dissonance produced by this juxtaposition 
exposes the myth of Gone With the Wind.180 In this light, the book is 
essentially the fictional equivalent of other forms of commentary 
traditionally deemed to be fair use, such as book and film reviews, which 
are also produced for profit.181 The district court’s erroneous approach to 
this transformative and commercial use was reversed on appeal.182 
 
 
 177. See Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for 
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 124–28 (2001) (“Use of protected material in news reporting, 
comment, or parody tend to yield more favorable fair use decisions than creative uses that result in 
new products.”). 
 178. Fortunately, the district court’s decision was reversed on appeal. See Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 179. See Suntrust, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1378. 
 180. See id. at 1375 (quoting a portion of the “Conversation with Alice Randall,” which is 
included at the end of The Wind Done Gone, in which Randall says that Gone With the Wind “is an 
inaccurate portrait of Southern history. It’s a South without miscegenation, without whippings, without 
families sold apart, without free blacks striving for their education, without Booker T. Washington and 
Frederick Douglass. GWTW depicts a South that never ever existed.”). 
 181. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (noting that most of § 107’s illustrative fair uses, including 
teaching, news reporting, and research, are “conducted for profit in this country” (quoting Harper & 
Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 182. See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1259. 
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Other courts likewise have dismissed the transformative content of 
commercial products in denying fair use. In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, the 
Second Circuit held that the defendant’s song Cunnilingus Champion of 
Company C, a sexually humorous adaptation of the song Boogie Woogie 
Bugle Boy of Company B, did not constitute fair use.183 The court 
emphasized the commercial nature of the use, observing that the 
defendant’s use resulted in a new commercial product of the same general 
type as the copyrighted work (both were songs). The court noted that 
“plaintiffs and defendants were competitors in the entertainment field,” 
and that both songs were “performed on the stage,” “sold as recordings,” 
and “sold in printed copies.”184 Yet, the court did not indicate how any of 
these general commonalities between the two very different songs showed 
that the defendant’s song supplanted the market for the plaintiff’s song.  
To the extent that all of the fair use factors are related because they 
indicate whether harm is likely to occur, judicial blurring of the line 
between the transformativeness factor and the commerciality factor in fair 
use analysis is not, in and of itself, a particular cause for concern. The real 
problem is that some courts are letting the commerciality of a defendant’s 
use cloud their judgment as to whether the plaintiff has suffered or is 
likely to suffer harm of a kind that is likely to affect incentives to create or 
distribute her work. Decisions affording less fair use protection for new 
commercial products regardless of harm are particularly troubling because 
these products include creative works such as novels and songs that 
greatly benefit the public and ordinarily lie at the core of copyright law’s 
protection. Indeed, they often convey a more powerful message than 
nonfictional histories and biographies that typically receive favored 
treatment as research or commentary.185 Moreover, they serve copyright’s 
speech-enhancing function by generating public discourse on social and 
historical issues. For instance, the novel The Da Vinci Code spurred much 
more comment on the historical and religious issues discussed therein than 
the nonfictional works from which it borrowed.186 Similarly, following the 
release of the movie Pearl Harbor in 2001, several newspaper articles 
critiqued the movie for historical inaccuracy.187 Numerous newspaper 
 
 
 183. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 184. See id. at 185. 
 185. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 5–7 (Beacon Press, Boston 1995) 
(“Literary art [in Aristotle’s view] . . . is ‘more philosophical’ than history, because history simply 
shows us ‘what happened,’ whereas works of literary art show us ‘things such as might happen’ in a 
human life.”). 
 186. See generally infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 187. One article criticized virtually the entire movie, interviewing World War II historians who 
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articles also debated the historical accuracy of the film Titanic following 
its release in 1997.188  
Even outside the context of new products, commercial uses are deemed 
less fair under the market failure theory than noncommercial uses. For 
instance, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 
publishers sued a copyshop for copying student coursepacks containing 
excerpts of their copyrighted material.189 The copyshop argued that 
because copying of such excerpts by the students themselves ordinarily 
would be deemed a fair use, and the copyshop was simply doing the same 
copying more efficiently, their copying should also be deemed a fair 
use.190 The copyshop was essentially arguing that the copyright owners 
suffered no harm, because if the copyshop had not done the copying, the 
students would have done it instead, and the students’ copying would not 
have required payment. The copyright owners, on the other hand, argued 
that the copyshop was deriving a commercial benefit from infringement of 
their copyrighted works, and they were entitled to share in this benefit.191 
Applying the fair use as market failure theory, the majority held that the 
use was not fair because the copyshop profited from copying the materials 
and easily could have paid for permission to copy the materials through 
the Copyright Clearance Center.192 
Under a harm-based approach, the court’s decision against fair use 
might be defensible if the students’ own copying of the course material 
would have been deemed fair solely on the ground that transaction costs 
prevented the students from obtaining permission to copy. As previously 
 
 
pointed out, among other things, that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not as surprising to the 
United States administration as the movie suggests, and that President Roosevelt never would have 
used his medical condition to motivate people the way his character did in the movie. See Mick 
LaSalle, Hollywood vs. History; Historians Say “Pearl Harbor’s” Version of the World War II Attack 
is Off the Mark, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 2001, at E1. See also Marilyn Salisbury, Portrayal of FDR 
Tampers with History, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 24, 2001, at E2 (arguing that portrayal of 
FDR in the film was inaccurate and offensive to people afflicted by polio); Smoke-Free War Films 
Irksome, TORONTO STAR, June 23, 2001, at 11 (finding it particularly irksome that although the movie 
was set in 1941, only one character in the movie smokes cigarettes). 
 188. Compare Douglas W. Phillips, Viewpoints: Titanic’s True History Sunk, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Mar. 18, 1998, at A35 (“Numerous testimonies from survivors detail the heroic deeds of first-class 
passengers on behalf of third-class passengers, . . . [showing that Titanic’s] neo-Marxist version of a 
Titanic embroiled in the throes of class warfare is simply false.”); with Mellissa Wright, Viewpoints: 
Survivors Mostly Male, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 26, 1998, at A35 (responding that author of the 
previous article “failed to mention that more first-class male passengers survived than did third-class 
women and children,” indicating that “[n]ot every rich man on that vessel was a hero”). 
 189. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 190. Id. at 1386 n.2. 
 191. Id. at 1387. 
 192. Id. 
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discussed, prohibitive transaction costs represent one situation in which 
the copyright holder suffers no harm, because she will not receive payment 
whether or not the copying is allowed, and therefore the copying makes 
her no worse off. Thus, if that was the sole basis upon which the students’ 
copying would have been deemed fair, and the copyshop was able to 
consolidate and reduce those transaction costs so that they were no longer 
prohibitive, then the copyshop’s use would not be deemed fair.  
It is likely, however, that the students’ copying would have been 
deemed fair on the ground that their copies of excerpts of various works 
was not likely to displace the copyright holders’ foreseeable sales or 
license fees. There was no evidence that the plaintiff publishers planned to 
create compilations of excerpts of their works for educational use or that, 
if they had planned to do so, compilations selected by individual 
professors would have impaired that market.193 Moreover, the record 
contained numerous declarations from professors indicating that they 
would not have assigned the entire original works under any 
circumstances, whether they were allowed to make the compilations or 
not.194  The only remaining question is whether the professors would have 
been likely to assign excerpts of the copyrighted works in the coursepacks 
if they knew that payment of license fees for such use was required.  If the 
professors or students would simply forgo the use of those works entirely 
rather than pay the license fees, the copying causes no harm to the 
copyright owner whether it is done by the students or by the copyshop. 
The case should have been remanded for fact findings on this issue so that 
harm could be determined.  
Under a harm-based approach, such copying should be deemed fair 
unless the copyright holder could prove that the copying caused her 
economic harm. Under the market failure approach, however, the court 
held that the use was not fair. The result is likely a net social loss, as 
students suffer a loss of educational opportunities that their professors 
would like to afford them, with no offsetting benefit to the copyright 
holders or creative progress. 
3. Personal Uses 
While personal uses are generally considered fairer than commercial 
uses, the judicial preference for transformative uses in recent years has 
caused debate over whether purely personal, nontransformative uses may 
 
 
 193. Id. at 1386. 
 194. Id. at 1409 (Ryan, J., dissenting); id. at 1398 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
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be deemed fair use.195 The dissent in Sony describes the preference for 
transformative uses over personal uses: 
[T]here is a crucial difference between the scholar and the ordinary 
user. When the ordinary user decides that the owner’s price is too 
high, and forgoes use of the work, only the individual is the loser. 
When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only does his 
own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his contribution to 
knowledge. The scholar’s work, in other words, produces external 
benefits from which everyone profits.196  
Yet, the Sony majority recognized that personal uses can be fair. As 
previously discussed, Sony’s harm-based approach to fair use holds that a 
personal use is fair if it does not deprive the copyright owner of sales she 
would have made otherwise. Given that personal copying is not generally 
very profitable, people who use copyrighted material for personal 
purposes will often forgo the use rather than pay for the material if 
payment is required. Moreover, transaction costs will often be prohibitive 
relative to the value of the use. In these situations, the copyright owner is 
unlikely to be compensated for these uses whether or not they are deemed 
fair, so the copying makes the copyright owner no worse off than she 
would have been without it. Because there is no harm, the use is 
presumably fair.  
To the extent that courts apply a balancing approach to fair use, 
however, they are likely to focus on the social value of the defendant’s 
use. The balancing approach’s emphasis on social value, especially when 
coupled with lax standards for proof of harm, results in an inherent bias in 
favor of transformative uses.197 Personal uses lose out because they 
typically generate little social value beyond the enjoyment the use brings 
to the individual user.  
The harm-based approach to fair use is a workable one that eliminates 
this bias. Requiring copyright owners to prove harm is a neutral 
requirement that applies equally to transformative, personal, and other 
 
 
 195. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1898–1903 (2007) 
(arguing that transformativeness should not determine whether personal use is fair); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE 
L.J. 535, 537 (2004) (arguing that emphasis on transformativeness has “limited our thinking” and has 
“begun to shrink” scope of fair use with regard to personal and socially beneficial uses). 
 196. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477–78 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 197. See Tushnet, supra note 195. 
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types of uses. Moreover, it serves the purpose of copyright by finding 
infringement only when harm can be shown.  
B. Second Factor: Nature of the Copyrighted Work; and Third Factor: 
Amount and Substantiality of the Use 
The second fair use factor assesses the nature of the copyrighted work, 
and the third factor assesses the amount and substantiality of the 
defendant’s borrowing. While courts dutifully consider these factors in 
their fair use analysis, they are interpreted in light of whether the copyright 
owner is likely to suffer harm as a result of the defendant’s use. For 
instance, the Supreme Court has held that in considering the nature of the 
copyrighted work under the second factor, creative works receive more 
protection than factual works.198 Yet, potential harm to the copyright 
holder seems to be the driving force in the fair use analysis for both types 
of works. Thus, copying from a creative work entitled to maximum 
copyright protection is still deemed a fair use if done for the purpose of 
transforming the work, ordinarily because the transformation makes the 
defendant’s work a poor substitute for the original. Likewise, copying 
from a less-protected factual work is often not deemed a fair use unless 
done for transformative purposes. 
The third factor, which takes into account both the quantity and quality 
of the portion of the copyrighted work taken, is similarly used to predict 
whether the defendant’s use is likely to cause material harm to the 
copyright owner. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the use of even a 
relatively small portion of a copyrighted work might constitute a 
substantial use under this factor if that portion constitutes the “heart” of 
the work. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held that although the 
Nation had copied only 300 words from President Ford’s 22,000-word 
manuscript, that portion was nevertheless substantial for purposes of the 
fair use analysis because it constituted the “heart” of the book—the part 
discussing President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon.199 Because there 
was actual evidence of market harm, the Court held that the defendant’s 
use of the short excerpt was not fair.200  
The Court has since reiterated its view that the amount and 
substantiality factor should be evaluated in light of potential harm to the 
 
 
 198. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 489 U.S. 340, 348–51 (1991); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237–38 (1990). 
 199. Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). 
 200. Id. at 567. 
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copyright owner. In Campbell, the Court held that even if the defendant’s 
rap version of the plaintiff’s song appropriated the heart of the original by 
taking the characteristic bass guitar riff and some of the most recognizable 
lyrics, the defendant’s use was still potentially fair use.201 The Court 
explained that a parodist is permitted to use at least the amount of the 
copyrighted work necessary to “conjure up” the original, and that how 
much more may be taken “will depend, say, on the extent to which the 
song’s overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, in 
contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute 
for the original.”202  
C. Fourth Factor: Harm to the Market for the Copyrighted Work 
As previously discussed, and consistent with the harm-based approach 
to fair use, courts already treat the fourth factor, harm to the market for the 
copyrighted work, as the most important factor in fair use analysis and use 
the other factors as proxies for determining whether a defendant’s use 
causes such harm. Yet, this factor is not always easy to apply, particularly 
given the potential for circularity identified here and elsewhere. This 
section is devoted to clarifying the proper approach to harm in a variety of 
cases. 
1. Presumptions and Proof of Harm 
There are essentially three categories of cases for determining whether 
a defendant’s acts constitute harmful infringement or fair use. The first 
category of cases includes those in which the plaintiff can provide specific 
proof that the defendant’s copying caused her to lose sales she would have 
made but for the defendant’s infringement. The Court’s decision in Harper 
& Row is perhaps the clearest example. There, Harper & Row was able to 
show that they actually had lost $12,500 when Time Magazine cancelled 
its publication contract after the defendant magazine scooped the story. 
The Court correctly observed that harm to the copyright owner is the most 
 
 
 201. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. The district court granted 2 Live Crew’s motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that the parodic use of the song was fair use. The appeals court 
reversed the lower court’s summary judgment, holding that because 2 Live Crew’s use of the song was 
commercial, it was presumptively unfair. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that 
2 Live Crew was not entitled to summary judgment where it had not submitted evidence regarding the 
potential for harm to the market for rap derivatives of the original under the fourth fair use factor. See 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590–91. 
 202. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. 
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important inquiry in fair use analysis. Accordingly, it held that where the 
defendant’s use causes harm by supplanting the copyright owner’s own 
attempts to enter the market for socially beneficial uses of a copyrighted 
work, that harm will not be weighed against the abstract public interest in 
allowing copying for socially beneficial purposes.  
In the second category of cases, the defendant engages in close or 
verbatim copying in the copyright owner’s foreseeable markets, but there 
is no specific evidence of actual harm to the copyright owner. In these 
cases copyright owners are entitled to a presumption of harm even without 
specific proof, subject to rebuttal by the defendant. In some instances, 
there is a high likelihood that the defendant’s use will usurp plaintiff’s 
foreseeable markets, such as where the defendant distributes a motion 
picture version of the plaintiff’s short story.203 In others, the plaintiff can 
claim as harm the fair market value of a license fee for the defendant’s 
own use of the work in those markets.204 Thus, courts currently presume 
copyright harm when the defendant’s use falls within the markets that the 
copyright owner “would in general develop or license others to 
develop”205 or “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets.”206 Clearly, these courts are attempting to limit liability to 
foreseeable markets, which are the markets most likely to influence an 
author’s decision to create a copyrighted work.  
In the third category of cases, the defendant might copy less from the 
copyrighted work, add to or transform the work, or exploit the work in 
markets that are more remote from the copyright owner’s foreseeable 
markets. The cases in this category have been more difficult to resolve. 
Indeed, these cases are mainly responsible for circularity in the definition 
of market harm and fair use. On one hand, when the defendant’s use 
changes the work or uses it in an unforeseeable market, it is very unlikely 
to substitute for the copyrighted work. On the other hand, because the 
copyright owner also controls the right to produce derivative works based 
on her work, it might be said that the copyright owner suffers a loss if she 
 
 
 203. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237–38 (defendant’s re-release of motion picture based on plaintiff’s 
short story was not fair use because it affected plaintiff’s expected markets for derivative works). See 
also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (defendant’s verbatim copying 
of hundreds of letters from plaintiff’s biography of George Washington to produce a shorter but 
similar biography not fair use). 
 204. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 924–25 (2d Cir. 1994) (copying 
individual journal articles for archival purposes was not fair use where copies were used for same 
purpose as purchased subscriptions and viable means of obtaining license for such copies existed). 
 205. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). 
 206. See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930. 
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is not paid at least a license fee for these uses. After all, the defendant has 
used and profited from the copyright owner’s property, and such activity 
seems to implicate trespass, free-riding, and unjust enrichment principles. 
As we have seen, however, this broad view of a copyright owner’s 
entitlements is often antithetical to copyright’s purpose of promoting 
innovative and creative works. Many courts have recognized this problem 
and have applied what is essentially a copyright harm approach to fair use. 
Under this view, if the defendant changes the meaning or message of the 
work or uses it in markets that are remote from or unrelated to the 
copyright owner’s intended markets, then the use is not very foreseeable. 
In these cases, a court is less likely to presume harm and more likely to 
require proof of actual harm. 
The Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com207 case, recently decided by the Ninth 
Circuit, provides a good illustration. There, Google used reduced-sized 
versions of Perfect 10's photographic images as thumbnails to facilitate 
internet searches on its search engine. The district court entered a 
preliminary injunction, holding that Google was unlikely to prevail in its 
fair use defense.208  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that 
Google was likely to be successful in establishing fair use.209 The court 
first concluded that although Google’s use did not add new meaning or 
message to the photographs, Google’s purpose—to facilitate internet 
searches—was “highly transformative” because thumbnails serve an 
entirely different function than the original photographs.210 The court 
explained that “[a]lthough an image may have been created originally to 
serve an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine 
transforms the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of 
information.”211  
Moreover, the appeals court disagreed with the district court’s 
conclusion that Google’s use was likely to cause market harm. The court 
considered three potential sources of harm to the copyright owner. First, 
Perfect 10 argued that the court should presume market harm because 
Google used the images commercially. The court rejected that argument, 
explaining that “this presumption does not arise when a work is 
transformative because ‘market substitution is at least less certain, and 
 
 
 207. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir.), amended on reh’g, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 208. See Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 710. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 721–22. 
 211. Id. at 721. 
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market harm may not be so readily inferred.’”212 Second, following the 
Ninth Circuit’s previous decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,213 the 
Perfect 10 court held that the use of photographic images as thumbnails in 
a search engine did not harm the market for sales of the full-size 
photographs. In both cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that given the 
small size and poor resolution of thumbnails, consumers were not likely to 
download the images as a substitute for buying the photographs.214  
Third, the Perfect 10 court considered harm to the “market for reduced-
size images.”215 Perfect 10 had licensed the downloading of smaller 
images for display on cell phones. The district court inferred that Google’s 
use of the thumbnails was likely to harm this market because “persons 
who can obtain Perfect 10 images free of charge from Google are less 
likely to pay for a download, and the availability of Google’s thumbnail 
images would harm Perfect 10’s market for cell phone downloads.”216  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, refusing to infer harm to a market so 
remote from the copyright owner’s intended markets. The court 
emphasized that “[t]his potential harm . . . remains hypothetical” because 
“the district court did not make a finding that Google users have 
downloaded thumbnail images for cell phone use.”217 Thus, the case 
makes clear that fair use turns on proof of harm to the copyright owner. 
When a use transforms the copyrighted work as to meaning or function, or 
exploits the work in a remote market, harm will not be inferred and must 
be proved through substituted sales or license fees.  
Interestingly, having examined carefully the issue of harm, the Ninth 
Circuit then purported to apply a balancing approach to fair use: 
Google has put Perfect 10’s thumbnail images (along with millions 
of other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the 
use intended by Perfect 10. In doing so, Google has provided a 
significant benefit to the public. Weighing this significant 
transformative use against the unproven use of Google’s thumbnails 
for cell phone downloads, and considering the other fair use factors, 
 
 
 212. Id. at 724 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)). 
 213. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 214. See Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 724; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. 
 215. The Ninth Circuit refused to consider this type of harm in the Kelly case because there was 
no evidence that the plaintiff had licensed reduced-size images. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821–22. 
 216. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 724–25. 
 217. Id. at 725. 
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all in light of the purpose of copyright, we conclude that Google’s 
use of Perfect 10’s thumbnails is a fair use.218 
Yet, it is clear here, as it was in Mattel, that the court did not really 
have to engage in balancing. There was undoubtedly public benefit in 
Google’s use, but there was no proven harm to balance against it. Rather, 
the Perfect 10 case reflects a harm-based approach to fair use. Under this 
approach, when no harm can be proved or inferred, the use is deemed fair, 
and balancing is unnecessary. 
It is important to note, however, that Perfect 10 is the kind of case in 
which balancing would have been appropriate if some minor harm had 
been found. For instance, if the court had found that Google’s use did 
decrease somewhat cell phone downloads of the copyrighted images, this 
harm would have been slight (especially in light of transaction costs) and 
would have occurred in remote markets, thus affecting incentives to create 
or distribute the work very little. By contrast, the social value of Google’s 
use was substantial. Moreover, the social value of the use was concrete 
and not merely duplicative of value the plaintiff would have produced 
through use of its own copyrighted material. Unlike in Harper & Row 
where the social value of the defendant’s use (news reporting) was merely 
abstract because it substituted for the value that the plaintiff’s own 
intended use would have produced, Google’s use of images in its search 
engine produced new value that the copyright owner was not in a position 
to produce.  
2. “Copyright Dilution” and Copyright Harm 
In other cases, however, courts have deviated from the proposed 
copyright harm approach and have denied fair use protection for uses that 
do not supplant the copyright holder’s sales or revenues. These courts 
wrongly recognize a different kind of harm that I will call “copyright 
dilution” due to its resemblance to the harm associated with trademark 
dilution.219 In general, courts have recognized two types of dilution for 
 
 
 218. Id. at 725. 
 219. See The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000), superseded 
by The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The FTDA granted the use of injunctive 
relief against any use of a famous mark that “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” 
See id. The FTDA defined “dilution” as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the 
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1127. By allowing the owner of a famous trademark to exclude others from using the mark 
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famous trademarks: blurring, in which a famous mark is used in 
connection with noncompeting goods in a way that reduces the 
distinctiveness of the mark; and tarnishment, in which a famous mark is 
used in connection with goods or services that could cause negative 
associations with the mark.220 Unlike the harm of consumer confusion 
associated with traditional trademark infringement, the harm associated 
with trademark blurring or tarnishment can be very speculative.221 
Whatever the legitimacy of dilution in trademark law, it is wholly 
inappropriate in copyright law. The Copyright Act provides no statutory 
basis for dilution in copyright law. Indeed, as previously discussed, the 
Act provides very little protection of image or reputation at all, and the 
Supreme Court has explicitly said that only harm due to market 
substitution should count in the fair use analysis. Nevertheless, courts 
sometimes apply, at least implicitly, a theory of copyright dilution that 
finds harm where the defendant’s use seems to blur or tarnish the 
distinctiveness of famous copyrighted works but does not seem to cause 
lost sales or license fees in expected markets.222  
 
 
when there is no likelihood of confusion as to the source of goods in commerce, the FTDA unleashed 
trademark law from its traditional moorings and created a new right with uncertain boundaries. This 
“‘fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection’” has attracted a great deal of negative 
attention from legal commentators. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2006) 
(quoting Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 
1687, 1698 (1999)). “[C]oncerned that dilution law represents an expansion in property rights at the 
expense of the public domain[,] . . . [commentators] worry that it stifles expression, hampers 
commercial communication, or reduces competition.” Id. 
 220. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429–32 (2003) (discussing types of 
dilution recognized under state anti-dilution laws and the FTDA). 
 221. See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis 
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997); Long, supra note 219, at 1059 (arguing that 
while trademark owners might not like having to share their consumers’ attention with other sources or 
products using the same mark, “[t]o say that this injures the [trademark owner] . . . presupposes that it 
has a right to a consumer’s attention span, an argument that is hard to make with a straight face.”). 
 222. Given the central role that fame of a trademark plays in trademark dilution cases, it is 
interesting to note the role that fame of a copyrighted work sometimes plays in fair use analysis. First, 
the fame of a copyrighted work affects application of the third factor, the amount and substantiality of 
the portion taken from the work. When a copyrighted work is so famous that it has become a 
household name or image, virtually any use of the work may seem like an appropriation of the “heart” 
of the work. See generally Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985). 
 Furthermore, in parody and satire cases, the amount that may be borrowed from famous works is 
sometimes less than the amount that may be taken from lesser-known works. See, e.g., Walt Disney 
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding when a parody targets a work with 
“widespread public recognition,” less copying is necessary to “conjure up” the original). Arguably, 
widespread recognition of a famous work could cut in the opposite direction, however. When a work is 
well known, a defendant who copies less from a copyrighted work in producing a parody of the work 
could cause confusion as to whether the use constitutes a parody of the work or a more general satire. 
Indeed, given that parody is heavily favored over satire and other transformative products, it is often 
important for a parodist to emphasize the elements borrowed from the original rather than the new 
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For instance, in the Dr. Seuss case,223 the Ninth Circuit purported to 
find harm based on market substitution, but the harm it describes is more 
related to a loss of distinctiveness or reputation of Dr. Seuss books. The 
court held that by depicting O.J. Simpson in a red-and-white-striped stove-
pipe hat like the one ordinarily worn by the plaintiff’s The Cat in the Hat 
character, the defendants had appropriated the plaintiff’s “highly 
expressive core” and therefore had taken a substantial portion of the 
copyrighted work under the third factor.224 Moreover, the court explained 
that because “[t]he good will and reputation associated with Dr. Seuss’s 
work is substantial,” the satirical use of the work is more likely to result in 
market substitution, and therefore “market harm may be more readily 
inferred.”225  
The court’s analysis in Dr. Seuss is seriously flawed. First, although it 
is true that the image of The Cat in the Hat character is perhaps the most 
famous element of the Dr. Seuss works, the defendants did not depict 
plaintiff’s character. Instead, it merely depicted O.J. Simpson wearing a 
similar hat. Moreover, the appropriation of this element was insignificant 
in light of the other fair use factors. The purpose of the O.J. Simpson book 
was to make a parodic or satirical use of the original. It comprised very 
different subject matter and borrowed very little literal expression from the 
plaintiff’s books. Second, the defendant’s book of rhymes chronicling the 
murder trial of O.J. Simpson would never compete with the Dr. Seuss 
childrens’ books. And despite the fame of Dr. Seuss works—or perhaps 
because of it—the Dr. Seuss copyright holder does not seem to be in a 
good position to produce or license works of a nature similar to the works 
produced by the defendants.  
As for market substitution, the most that could be said is that the 
copyright owner feared that the defendant’s use could cause some 
hypothetical or speculative harm at some point in the distant future. 
Rather, the court incorrectly assumed harm based, at least implicitly, on a 
theory of copyright dilution. The court’s emphasis on Dr. Seuss’s 
reputation and the misappropriation of Dr. Seuss’s image is reminiscent of 
trademark dilution claims, where any use that incorporates or replicates 
 
 
elements. For instance, any parody of Gone With the Wind should probably include a female character 
who is very much like Scarlet O’Hara; otherwise, the audience will assume the work is a satire of the 
South rather than a parody of Gone With the Wind. 
 223. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 224. See id. at 1402. 
 225. Id. at 1403. The Ninth Circuit apparently reconsidered its inference of harm for 
transformative uses in the Perfect 10 and Kelly cases, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 
207–17. 
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that distinctive quality in a new product renders the original less 
distinctive. It is this supposed loss of distinctiveness—not any real 
potential market substitution—that the court characterizes as “market 
harm” in its fair use analysis. 
At the very least, the Dr. Seuss court should have required the plaintiff 
to provide concrete evidence of market harm, showing that it has licensed 
such works in the past or that it had immediate plans to do so. If the 
plaintiff could not provide such evidence, the use should have been 
deemed fair. 
A district court similarly adopted a dilution theory of harm in a case 
involving Ty’s Beanie Babies.226 The defendant, West Highland 
Publishing, created a book that provided information about all of the 
collectible stuffed animals, including historical essays, evaluations as to 
price, and recommendations on whether to buy. Because the book also 
contained photographs of the Beanie Babies, however, the court found that 
the book infringed Ty’s copyright.227 
In granting Ty’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the 
manufacturing and selling of defendant’s books, the court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the book was a transformative work deserving 
of protection under the fair use doctrine. Although Ty would not be in a 
position to create a book providing impartial market assessments of the 
collectibles, and it was not clear that such a book would compete with an 
ordinary book of Beanie Babies photographs, the court found the book 
harmed Ty’s market for derivative works.228 
It is clear, however, that the court was more concerned with dilution of 
the Beanie Babies’ famous and distinctive image than with harm to 
markets that Ty might reasonably exploit. The court noted that the 
“popularity” of the Beanie Babies is due largely to Ty’s “own shrewd 
business practice of creating a shortage in order to excite the market,” and 
that “[b]y recurring shortages, Ty seeks to maintain the enormous demand 
and popularity of Beanie Babies for as long as possible, and consequently 
seeks to avoid overexposure or market saturation.”229 Thus, the court 
found that these “derivative works could have a negative long-term effect 
 
 
 226. See Ty, Inc. v. West Highland Publ’g, Inc., No. 98 C 4091, 1998 WL 698922, at *15–16 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1998). 
 227. Id. at *9. 
 228. Id. at *15–16. 
 229. Id. at *16. 
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on the market for Ty’s works by destroying the marketing image Ty has 
carefully created for its products . . . .”230  
The type of harm that occurs when a defendant’s work “destroy[s] the 
marketing image” of a plaintiff’s work is obviously very different from the 
type that occurs when a defendant’s work actually supplants sales of the 
plaintiff’s work.231 Indeed, the concern with “avoiding overexposure” in 
order to maintain a work’s distinctive “image” is the heart of a dilution 
claim.232 
Another example of copyright dilution—this time by tarnishment—was 
the Second Circuit’s decision in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson.233 As previously 
discussed, the court held that a song entitled Cunnilingus Champion of 
Company C, which combined new, sexually humorous lyrics with the tune 
of Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B, did not constitute fair use.234 
The court rejected the defendant’s testimony indicating that the purpose of 
the new song was to “combin[e] the innocent music of the ’40’s with 
words often considered to be taboo to make a very funny point,”235 
although it is difficult to imagine what other purpose the defendant would 
have had in producing the work. The court therefore concluded that the 
new song was neither parody nor satire and was not otherwise 
transformative,236 even though the obvious and critical differences 
between the two songs made it highly unlikely that the new song would 
supplant the demand for the original and no other harm was proved. 
Rather than using an incentive theory of fair use based on harm, the 
Second Circuit essentially applied a dilution theory based on tarnishment 
and free-riding. The court found offensive the juxtaposition of what the 
defendants referred to as “the humorous practice of cunnilingus” with a 
song that the court said “achieved its greatest popularity during the tragic 
and unhappy years of World War II, in which 292,131 Americans lost 
their lives.”237 The court summarized its fair use analysis by saying, “We 
are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a 
competitor’s copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform 
 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 234. MCA, 677 F.2d at 185. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 184. 
 237. Id. at 184 n.1 (internal quotations omitted). 
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it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a 
parody or satire on the mores of society.”238  
Thus, although the Supreme Court held in Campbell that only the 
demonstrable harm of market substitution should be considered in fair use 
analysis, a few lower courts have rejected fair use claims based on the 
speculative harm of copyright dilution. But copyright law should not 
embrace a concept of harm that replicates the uncertainty and confusion 
that dilution has produced in trademark law. Some trademark scholars 
have argued that the harm associated with dilution is “dauntingly elusive,” 
resulting in trademark protection that “is by its nature absolute and 
unlimitable.”239 Others have produced empirical evidence showing that, at 
least prior to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(FTDA), courts had become uncomfortable with the lack of definition of 
the harm associated with trademark dilution and had begun to rein in 
dilution claims.240  
The fair use as market failure theory facilitates claims based on 
copyright dilution. By recognizing a nearly absolute property right in 
copyrights, the market failure theory condemns dilution of copyrighted 
works even when it causes no demonstrable economic harm to the 
copyright owner. Under the proposed harm-based approach, copyright 
harm occurs only where the defendant’s use supplants the demand for the 
plaintiff’s work, not where it causes some vague or speculative harm to the 
image of a work. Where the defendant’s use of the copyrighted work—
often to create a new work—produces value to the defendant or the public 
without supplanting any of the copyright owner’s sales, it increases the 
number or availability of creative works without harming the copyright 
owner’s incentives to create. Denying fair use in these circumstances is 
inefficient and does not serve the incentive theory of copyright.  
 
 
 238. Id. at 185. 
 239. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 684 
(2004). 
 240. See Long, supra note 219 (reporting empirical evidence showing a significant decline in the 
rates of relief in trademark dilution cases over the past several years). In 2003, the Supreme Court held 
in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue that trademark owners must show “actual dilution,” rather than 
merely a likelihood of dilution, indicating that some harm is required. See Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). Congress recently responded by amending the FTDA to effect a 
legislative overruling of the Moseley case. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (granting injunctive relief for 
uses of famous marks that are “likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment”).  For a description 
of the main provisions of the FTDA prior to these amendments, see supra note 219. 
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D. Additional Considerations: Burdens of Proof, Harm Offsets, and 
Injunctive Relief 
If copyright law is to realize fully a harm-based approach to fair use, 
courts must make three important changes to existing doctrine (in addition 
to what has already been discussed): they must change the allocation of 
the burden of proof, allow defendants to offset proof of harm with proof 
that their use also increased sales of the copyrighted work, and refuse to 
grant injunctive relief where the social value of the defendant’s use is 
substantial.  
1. Burdens of Proof 
As much of the foregoing analysis has already suggested, courts must 
change the way they assign the burden of proof in many fair use cases. 
Currently, most courts require the defendant to bear the burden of proof on 
all fair use factors, including the harm to the market factor.241 When the 
defendant’s use usurps the plaintiff’s most foreseeable markets, meaning 
that the use is likely to cause material harm in the form of lost sales or 
license fees, it is appropriate to require the defendant to rebut the 
presumption of harm by showing that, in fact, her use has not caused 
harm. Conversely, when the defendant’s use does not fall within one of the 
plaintiff’s foreseeable uses or is not otherwise likely to cause lost sales, 
assigning the burden of proof to the defendant is not appropriate. Under 
the harm-based approach to fair use, and consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sony,242 the plaintiff should bear the burden in such 
cases to prove that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur. 
2. Offsets 
Because the harm-based approach to fair use emphasizes proof of the 
harm actually suffered or likely to be suffered by the copyright owner, 
courts should recognize that uses of copyrighted works can increase as 
well as decrease sales. There are many cases in which the defendant’s 
work actually increases sales of the original work. For instance, in a recent 
English case, Random House, publisher of the book The Holy Blood and 
 
 
 241. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
 242. 464 U.S. at 451 (when no presumption of harm is warranted, plaintiff bears burden of proof 
to show harm in fair use analysis). See also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (indicating that fair use may be 
viewed as a limitation on prima facie infringement rather than as an affirmative defense in stating that 
“the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright”). 
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the Holy Grail, sued Dan Brown, the author of The Da Vinci Code, for 
copyright infringement.243 The court held that Brown had borrowed only 
uncopyrighted material, and therefore he was not liable for 
infringement.244 But if the case had proceeded in an American court, and 
the court had reached the issue of fair use, harm would have been the 
central issue. In the unlikely event that the plaintiff was able to show that 
the defendant’s book caused any harm to the plaintiff’s book, the court 
also should have allowed the defendant to submit evidence of an offsetting 
increase in sales. As a CBS news story reported, the plaintiff’s book “has 
enjoyed enhanced popularity on the coattails of the Da Vinci Code’s 
success,” and “Amazon.com reported a 3,500 percent increase in sales 
right after the [English] trial began.”245 Although better empirical evidence 
is needed, there is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that other 
transformative works increase sales of the works on which they are 
based.246  
Currently, most courts do not take into account evidence that the 
allegedly infringing work actually increased sales of the copyrighted work. 
It seems that only the Seventh Circuit considers such evidence. Judge 
Posner has held that uses that increase sales of the original work 
(economic complements) are fair while uses that supplant sales of the 
original work (economic substitutes) are not fair.247 The substitute-
complement distinction approximates the harm approach, though it does 
not seem to contemplate that many uses can be both substitutes as well as 
complements.  
In service of copyright’s incentive purpose, the harm-based approach to 
fair use requires courts to determine the actual effect a challenged use has 
on markets for the copyrighted work. Thus, it is imperative that courts 
allow a defendant to offset any lost sales that his use causes by showing 
that the use has also increased sales of the work. This single doctrinal 
change would produce obvious and correct outcomes in some cases that 
 
 
 243. See Richard Roth, CBS News, Mining Da Vinci, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2006/03/10/listening_post/main1390534.shtml (Mar. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Mining Da Vinci]; Carol 
Memmott, ‘Da Vinci’ Paperback vs. the Jesus Papers, USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 2006, at D1; Gordon 
Raynor & Ben Quinn, Code Author Clear as Book Sales Soar—Court Victory Sparks Yet More 
Conspiracy Talk, THE SUNDAY MAIL (Austl.), Apr. 9, 2006, at 5. 
 244. See Mining Da Vinci, supra note 243. 
 245. See id. (“Sales have increased 745 percent just in the U.K., . . . [reflecting] a jump from about 
350 copies a week to around 3,000.”).  
 246. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 8, at 596 (discussing anecdotal marketing evidence 
suggesting that transformative works based on the novels Jane Eyre, Lolita, or Mrs. Dalloway might 
have increased the sales of the original works). 
 247. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Intern. Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517–19 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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are considered difficult under current law. For instance, where the plaintiff 
is unable to show that the defendant’s use has caused or will cause her to 
lose sales, and makes the potentially circular argument that she has 
suffered harm in the form of a lost license fee, the defendant would be 
permitted to offset that harm by showing that the use has increased sales of 
the copyrighted work.  
3. Entitlement to Injunctive Relief 
Following the Supreme Court’s recent statement in eBay v. 
MercExchange, courts should not assume that when copyright 
infringement is found, injunctive relief will necessarily follow.248 The 
Court noted that it “has consistently rejected invitations to replace 
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been 
infringed.”249 Such “equitable considerations” include the effect of 
granting an injunction on the public interest.250 Thus, even when the harm 
caused by the defendant’s use requires compensation, the social value of 
the defendant’s use should weigh heavily in a court’s decision on whether 
to grant an injunction.  
This approach maximizes the relevant interests by imposing a license 
that allows the socially beneficial use to continue while compensating 
copyright owners for their harm. In this way, the harm-based approach is 
consistent with recent proposals for limited injunctive relief when the fair 
use issue is a close call.251  
 
 
 248. Although eBay involved the issue of injunctive relief in a patent infringement case, the court 
reasoned by analogy to copyright injunctions. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006) (“[T]he Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant injunctive relief 
‘on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.’” (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1839. 
 251. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 578 n.10 (1994) (“Because the 
fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of permissible borrowing 
. . . the goals of copyright law . . . are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive 
relief . . . .”); Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require a License?, supra note 8, at 186–87 (“[I]n 
many circumstances fair use should separate the idea that the copyright owner should be compensated 
for a use from the idea that the copyright owner should be able to control that use.”); Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, supra note 9, at 1132 (arguing that injunctive relief is justified in cases of “simple 
piracy” but not in cases “raising reasonable contentions of fair use”). Cf. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839–40 
(2006) (prevailing plaintiff in patent infringement action on unpracticed patent not automatically 
entitled to permanent injunction under Patent Act but must satisfy traditional four-factor test for 
equitable remedy). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Copyright’s incentive purpose requires courts to find fair use for uses 
of copyrighted works that do not harm or that actually increase incentives 
to create or distribute those works. Historically, copyright law served that 
purpose by granting narrow protection against uses that were obviously 
likely to cause copyright owners to lose sales of their works. As copyrights 
have expanded, the fair use doctrine has been invoked to mediate between 
uses that serve copyright’s purpose and those that do not. Unfortunately, 
current theories of fair use, including the market failure theory and the 
balancing theory, are not only ineffective at achieving this purpose but 
also potentially harmful to it. 
A harm-based approach to fair use fully serves copyright’s purpose. 
The Supreme Court and other courts have attempted to develop the harm-
based approach to fair use. Under this approach, a use constitutes 
infringement only when the use causes harm that is likely to affect a 
reasonable copyright owner’s decision to create or distribute the work. 
Once such harm is found, however, courts should balance that harm 
against the social value of the use only where the harm is slight or remote 
in relation to the social value of allowing the use. If courts take the 
proposed steps to realize this approach fully, copyright law has a much 
better chance of fulfilling copyright’s constitutional purpose of 
encouraging creative progress. 
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